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Drop the Shoe: A Law of Personal
Jurisdiction
Douglas D. McFarland'
I. INTRODUCTION

The history of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence in the United States is
familiar to courts, scholars, and first-year law students alike. The Supreme Court
of the United States decided Pennoyer v. Neff' in 1877 by borrowing
international law and conflict of laws principles to shape a law of personal
jurisdiction based on territorial power of the states. Pennoyer held that an
unwilling, nonresident defendant must be served within the boundaries of the
state. During the ensuing sixty-eight years, courts struggled with application of
this rigid principle to an expanding and increasingly mobile economy, and to a
new type of defendant, the corporation.' Pennoyer was not working.
In 1945, the Supreme Court started afresh in InternationalShoe Co. v.
Washington.3 The jurisdictional reach of a court expanded beyond its state
borders. Henceforth, due process would allow a court to assert personal

jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant served outside the state so long as that
defendant had "certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of
the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'

4

During the ensuing fifty-eight years, courts have struggled not only with the
application of this test to a myriad of factual patterns but also with a maze of

* Associate Dean for Teaching and Scholarship and Professor of Law, Hamline

University School of Law, St. Paul, Minnesota. The author thanks Sam Sigelman, HUSL
class of 2003, for his outstanding research assistance on this Article.
1. 95 U.S. 714 (1877); see infra note 6.
2. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,250-51 (1958); infra text accompanying
notes 8-9.
3. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
4. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
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attempted refinements of the flaccid minimum contacts principle itself.'
InternationalShoe is not working.

The Supreme Court should again start afresh. A workable test placed
between the extreme rigidity of Pennoyer and the extreme malleability of
InternationalShoe is needed.

This Article begins in Part II with an examination of the origins of the
International Shoe minimum contacts test, and then in Part III analyzes and
critiques the opinion and the test. Part IV looks at later Supreme Court cases that
attempt to refine and apply the test, and Part V looks at the same pattern for other
federal courts and state courts. These Parts lead to the conclusion that the
minimum contacts test should be abandoned in favor of a new law for personal
jurisdiction, and so to Part VI, which proposes that the Court should "drop the
Shoe." After an examination in Part VII of whether state boundaries should be
considered in the formulation of a new law of personal jurisdiction, the Article
proposes new law in Part VIII. In order to determine the practicality of the
proposed new law, the Article applies it to the facts presented in previous
Supreme Court personal jurisdiction cases, and to some of today's commonly
recurring factual situations, in Part IX. The Article concludes in Part X.
II. ORIGINS OF THE MINIMUM CONTACTS TEST
American constitutional law of personal jurisdiction largely began in 1877
with the Supreme Court's decision in Pennoyerv. Neff." The Court decided that
due process prohibits personal jurisdiction over a nonconsenting nonresident
who is not served within the boundaries of the state:

5. See infra Parts IV, V.

6. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). The English and American decisions leading to Pennoyer
are traced in Geoffrey C. Hazard, A General Theory of State Court Jurisdiction, 1965

SUP. CT. REv. 241, 252-62. He concludes that the strands of the decisions were pulled
together earlier by Justice Joseph Story in the context of conflict of laws, JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1834), and transplanted into personal

jurisdiction rooted in the Due Process Clause by Justice Stephen J. Field, the primary
author of Pennoyer. "The basic organization, the intellectual structure, and much of the
language of Justice Field's opinion is taken straight from Story .... " Hazard, supra, at
262; see also Stewart Jay, "Minimum Contacts" as a Unified Theory of Personal
Jurisdiction: A Reappraisal,59 N.C. L. REV. 429, 452-54 (1981). Part of Pennoyer's
intellectual lineage is also found in international law principles of sovereignty among
nations. See Walter W. Heiser, A "Minimum Interest" Approach to Personal
Jurisdiction,35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 915, 929 (2000); Andrew L. Strauss, Where
AmericaEnds andthe InternationalOrderBegins: Interpretingthe JurisdictionalReach
of the U.S. Constitution in Light of a ProposedHague Convention on Jurisdictionand
Satisfaction ofJudgments, 61 ALA. L. REv. 1237, 1250-54 (1998).
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The authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the
territorial limits of the State in which it is established. Any attempt to
exercise authority beyond those limits would be deemed in every other
forum, as has been said by this court, in illegitimate assumption of
power, and be resisted as mere abuse.'
The Pennoyertest endured for nearly seven decades.
During those years, both the Supreme Court and other courts increasingly
struggled to apply this seemingly clear test in individual cases for two primary
reasons. First, the test was created at a time in American history when travel
from state to state was difficult and meaningful; in the twentieth century,
interstate travel became cheap and common. Second, the test was created for
natural persons, not for fictional entities such as corporations; in the twentieth
century, America's business was becoming the domain of corporations. A court
could rather easily determine when a natural person was served within state
boundaries, but faced difficulties when dealing with a fictional person without
a corporeal body. Courts attempted to satisfy Pennoyerby finding a corporate
defendant had "consented" to suit in a state, was "present" in a state, was "doing
business" in a state, or had engaged in "solicitation plus" activity in a state

7. Pennoyer,95 U.S. at 720. The Court recognized that personal jurisdiction could
also be based on consent, status, and domicile. Id. at 720-21,733. These other bases for
personal jurisdiction are not the subject of this Article.
8. The Supreme Court itself later said, "In a continuing process of evolution this
Court accepted and then abandoned 'consent,' 'doing business,' and 'presence' as the
standard for measuring the extent of state judicial power over such corporations."
McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220,222 (1957). This evolution is traced in some
detail in sources such as 16 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
108.42[7][b] (3d ed. 2003); 4 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1065-66 (3d ed. 2002); Developments in the Law-State

CourtJurisdiction,73 HARv. L. REV. 911,919-23 (1960). Perhaps the "final" refinement
of Pennoyer before its abandonment was the "solicitation plus" rule:
The case of Green v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. laid down the rule that
solicitation of business is not of itself sufficient to constitute such doing of

business in the state as to vest the state courts with jurisdiction in personam
over the foreign corporation. The InternationalHarvester Co. v. Kentucky
case modified that decision by holding that when solicitation was coupled
with other activities, although the activities were incident to interstate
commerce, the corporation was doing business within the state.
Recent Decisions, Conflict ofLaws-PersonalJurisdictionover Foreign Corporations,

21 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 442,443 (1946) (citing Int'l Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S.
579 (1914); Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co., 205 U.S. 530 (1907)); see also
Christopher D. Cameron & Kevin R. Johnson, Death of a Salesman? Forum Shopping
and Outcome DeterminationUnderInternational Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 769,80607 (1995); Austin W. Scott, Jurisdictionover Nonresidents Doing Business Within a
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Because the Court kept attempting to fit new and unanticipated factual
situations into the Pennoyertest, it "produced a 'torrent' of decisions attempting
to define the precise circumstances under which a state could hale defendants
into its courts consistent with the Due Process Clause."9 Increasingly from year
to year, these decisions sacrificed predictability for flexibility, which in turn
encouraged more jurisdictional challenges. Finally, the Supreme Court in 1945
abandoned the Pennoyer test in favor of an entirely new test: the test of
InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington."0

The impetus for the Court's decision to abandon Pennoyerin favor of a new
test for personal jurisdiction is thus fairly clear. Unfortunately, the origins of the
Court's minimum contacts test announced in InternationalShoe are almost
entirely obscure. The new test for personal jurisdiction, i.e., when the exercise
of in personam jurisdiction by a state court satisfies the requirements of the Due
Process Clause," would no longer be service within the boundaries of a state.
A state could henceforth serve beyond its boundaries, as
due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice."12

State, 32 HARV. L. REV. 871 (1919).
The courts struggled with jurisdictional concepts applied to a corporation acting
outside its state of incorporation in part because even long before Pennoyer,the judicial
attitude toward corporations was as follows:
[A] corporation can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the
sovereignty by which it is created. It exists only in contemplation of law, and
by force of the law; and where that law ceases to operate, and is no longer
obligatory, the corporation can have no existence. It must dwell in the place
of its creation, and cannot migrate to another sovereignty.
Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (1 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839).
9. Cameron & Johnson, supra note 8, at 785.
10. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
11. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
12. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)). The new InternationalShoe test is rooted in the Due Process Clause. Some
writers have suggested that choice was a mistake. The Court might have decided instead
to look for a limitation on state court exercises of personal jurisdiction in the Commerce
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Developments in the Law, supranote 8, at 983-87.
The Court might have employed the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. CONST. art IV, §
1. Sarah R. Cebik, Note, A Riddle Wrapped in a Mystery Inside an Enigma: General
PersonalJurisdiction& Notions ofSovereignty, 1998 ANN. SURv. AM. L. 1, 15-16. The

Court might have employed the Tenth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. X. Allen R.
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Certainly the court carefully chose these words. But chose from where?
Did Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, the primary author of the opinion, find
"minimum contacts" in an earlier text, or did he invent it? Where did he find
"traditional notions of fair play," or "substantial justice"? Tracing the first use
and subsequent development of these words or like phrases would shed light on
the intended meaning of the new test.
The effort to find an earlier origin of "minimum contacts" is futile. Others
have searched for the derivation with no success. 3 I joined the search with the
same result. The two-word phrase does not appear in any earlier opinion of the
Supreme Court or of any other court. It does not appear in any earlier law review
article or commentary. The inescapable conclusion is that Chief Justice Stone
created the phrase wholly out of his fertile legal imagination. Consequently, we
are left with the bare language of this portion of the test itself. No history aids
our interpretation.
A search for the origins of the other portion of the test, i.e., "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice," is only slightly more successful.
Certainly, the InternationalShoe opinion indicates that the phrase is quoted from
Milliken v. Meyer, 4 a case decided only five years earlier. Yet the phrase plays
no part in the Milliken Court's holding that domicile provides a sufficient basis
for personal jurisdiction; instead, it appears in dicta that personal service outside

Kamp, Beyond Minimum Contacts: The Supreme Court's New JurisdictionalTheory,
15 GA. L. REv. 19, 38 (1980). The Court might have refused to place any constitutional
limit on state court jurisdiction. Patrick J. Borchers, JurisdictionalPragmatism:
International Shoe's Half-Buried Legacy, 28 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 561 (1995). This
Article does not engage in such an inquiry, and accepts that the Court has placed
jurisdictional analysis in the Due Process Clause.
As part of its new test, the Court quoted from one of its recent decisions on notice.
See infra text accompanying notes 14-18. The fact that part of the InternationalShoe test
traces back to a notice case may have some meaning. Notice has always been rooted in
the fairness notions of the Due Process Clause. That may explain in part why the Court
continued to base the law of personal jurisdiction in due process rather than another
portion of the Constitution.
13. A heroic effort was made in Cameron &Johnson, supranote 8, at 809-15, to
find the origin of "minimum contacts." The authors examined precedents, the record, the
parties' submissions, internal Court memoranda, and Chief Justice Stone's personal
papers; they even corresponded with surviving law clerks of the 1944 Term of Court. All
sources yielded nothing.
The same authors also included fascinating accounts of the detailed factual record
of the case, id. at 786-96, and of the subsequent history of the corporate defendant, id.
at 796-99.
14. 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
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the state satisfies the due process jurisdictional requirement of notice."5 The
Milliken opinion in its turn cited McDonald v. Mabee 6 as precedential support
for the phrase. McDonald was a notice case as was Milliken. A defendant,
although remaining domiciled in the state, had departed with no intention to
return, and the case held that notice through service by publication did not satisfy
due process. 7 More importantly, the Court did use the terms "fair play" and
"substantial justice" in the opinion. Yet the terms were employed separately to
support the conclusion that notice was insufficient. The two terms were not
connected or even on the same page in the opinion. 8 Thus, Milliken is the first
case to have used the phrase.
A search of opinions prior to Milliken and McDonald yields little. The
Supreme Court had used the phrase "fair play" in two other opinions shortly
before Milliken, so a strong likelihood exists that the language in those opinions
influenced Chief Justice Stone. Each was authored by another Justice, but Stone
was a member of the Court at the time. Two years before Milliken, Justice Felix
Frankfurter wrote that an administrative agency is required to conduct a fair and
open hearing as part of "fair play,"'.9 and in the same year as Milliken, Chief
Justice Charles Evans Hughes wrote that administrative agencies must "accredit
themselves by acting in accordance with the cherished judicial tradition
Thus, language from
embodying the basic concepts of fair play."2

15. The adequacy of service outside the state
so far as due process is concerned is dependent on whether or not the form of
substituted service provided for such cases and employed is reasonably
calculated to give him actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to
be heard. If it is, the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice
implicit in due process are satisfied.
Id. at 463 (citations omitted).
16. 243 U.S. 90 (1917).
17. Id. at 91.
18. "And in states bound together by a Constitution and subject to the 14th

Amendment, great caution should be used not to let fiction deny thefairplay that can be
secured only by a pretty close adhesion to fact." Id. (emphasis added).
"To dispense with personal service the substitute that is most likely to reach the
defendant is the least that ought to be required if substantialjustice is to be done." Id.
at 92 (emphasis added).
19. FederalCommunication Commission v. PottsvilleBroadcastingCo., 309 U.S.

134, 143-44 (1940), states, "To be sure, the laws under which these agencies operate
prescribe the fundamentals of fair play. They require that interested parties be afforded
an opportunity for hearing and that judgment must express a reasoned conclusion."
20. Morgan v. UnitedStates, 304 U.S. 1(1938), uses the phrase twice. The Court
wrote first:
The [vast] expansion of this field of administrative regulation in response to
the pressure of social needs is made possible under our system by adherence
to the basic principles that the Legislature shall appropriately determine the

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol68/iss4/1
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administrative law cases appears to have influenced the due process requirements
of notice in Milliken; InternationalShoe in turn borrowed the language for a new
test of personal jurisdiction. Prior to these cases, the phrase "fair play" appears
only three times in Supreme Court opinions, and twice earlier in counsel
arguments: on none of these occasions does the Court or counsel appear to be
using a term of art.21
A search of earlier opinions of other courts for the phrase "fair play and
substantial justice" yields only some indirect hints of possible sources.
"Traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" appears in no opinion.
"Fair play and substantial justice" appears in no opinion. Two early opinions do
use the terms "fair play" and "justice" in close proximity.22 The first decision
that actually uses both the phrase "fair play" and the phrase "substantial justice"
is a 1914 state decision on priority of creditors, but the opinion does not link the
phrases together, and each phrase is used to support a different discussion in the
opinion.23 Later, in 1924, a federal decision on personal jurisdiction uses similar

standards of administrative action and that in administrative proceedings of
a quasi-judicial character the liberty and property of the citizen shall be
protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play.
Id. at 14-15. Later, the Court employed the two-word phrase again:
For, as we said at the outset, if these multiplying agencies deemed to be
necessary in our complex society are to serve the purposes for which they are
created and endowed with vast powers, they must accredit themselves by
acting in accordance with the cherishedjudicial tradition embodying the basic
concepts of fair play.
Id. at22.
21. A dissenting opinion in Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 370 (1917) (Day, J.,
dissenting), argues that a taking of property is a "violation of the spirit of fair play and
equal right which the Constitution intended to secure in the due process clause." Three
years earlier, the Court had invalidated a double damages penalty because "the rudiments
of fair play required by the 14th Amendment are wanting." Chicago, Milwaukee, & St.
Paul Ry. v. Polt, 232 U.S. 165, 168 (1914). The Court in Klein v. Hoffheimer, 132 U.S.
367,378 (1889), said a garnishee must act with "[f]air play and honest dealing." Counsel
in two earlier cases argued to the Court that it should use its powers to ensure that their
clients receive "fair play." Sinnot v. Davenport, 63 U.S. (1 How.) 227, 237 (1859);
Williams v. Gibbes, 58 U.S. (1 How.) 239, 246 (1854).
22. A federal court wrote that requiring an officer charged with an impeachable
offense to testify "is abhorrent to our feelings of justice and fair play." United States v.
Collins, 25 F. Cas. 545, 550 (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1873) (No. 14,837). A state court wrote that
the duty on a plaintiff to plead with clarity "appeals to our sense ofjustice and fair play."
Stateexrel.Major v. Mo. Pac. Ry., 144 S.W. 1088,1091 (Mo. 1912) (quoting Shohoney
v. Quincy, 0. & K.C. Ry., Co., 122 S.W. 1032, 1032 (Mo. 1909)).
23. McKinney v. Street, 81 S.E. 757, 758 (N.C. 1914) (quoting Norwood v. Thorp,
64 N.C. 682, 685 (N.C. 1870)), opines that refusing priority to any one of all debts
obtained against a party during the same court term is "simply an affirmance of an
ancient principle of the common law, adopted in furtherance ofjustice, to give fair play,
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24
terms in close proximity in denying a motion to quash service. Finally, the
closest match of all occurs in a 1941 opinion on notice by the high court of
Massachusetts.2" The language of all of these earlier opinions is suggestive.
Chief Justice Stone may have been influenced by any of them. Yet that is
speculation. He cited none.
Certainly when Chief Justice Stone wrote of "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice," he had in mind the traditions of equity jurisprudence.
Perhaps the most basic principle of equity has been fairness, which came to mean
fairness in each individual case.26 That tradition fits the InternationalShoe caseby-case test snugly. Indeed, some cases in the early history of the law of
personal jurisdiction support a fairness-in-the-individual-case principle. These
cases first came together in the Supreme Court's due process personal
jurisdiction doctrine in Pennoyer" True, Pennoyerwas not a case-by-case test,
yet its equity heritage contributed to the "traditional notions" given substance in
InternationalShoe. Consequently, one can say with confidence that the "fair
play and substantial justice" portion of the new test traces back into equity. The

to prevent an indecent rush to get a judgment docketed first." Later on the same page,
the court writes, "[T]he court is bound, if required for the purpose of doing substantial
justice, to take notice that such legal day consists of several natural days . . . ." Id.
(quoting HERBERT BROOM, BROOM'S LEGAL MAXIMS 128 (8th ed. 1882)).
24. Knutson v. Campbell River Mills, 300 F. 241, 242 (W.D. Wash. 1924),
concludes, "Fair play and orderly administration of justice require that the defendant
answer to the courts of this jurisdiction for the injury complained of."
25. "Such a notice must comply with the requirements of natural justice and of fair
play, and must, in conjunction with the hearing, be sufficient to accomplish substantial
justice in accordance with the general aim of similar statutory proceedings." Higgins v.
Bd. of License Comm'rs, 31 N.E.2d 526, 529 (Mass. 1941). While the language of this
opinion is closest to the language of InternationalShoe, it comes after Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940), used the phrase as a whole.
26. "The linguistic origins of equity were the Greek epieikeia and the Latin
aequitas. The original classical meaning was 'fairness,' but the Romans added a related
notion, the ideal of a 'fairness' that transcends that strict positive law in those individual
situations where a mechanical application of a rule of law would be unjust." DANIEL R.
COQUILLETTE, THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HERITAGE 184 (1999); see also PETER M.
HORSFELD, EQUITY INA NUTSHELL 1 (1960) ("Much of such natural justice cannot be
judicially enforced but must be left to the individual conscience to decide what is right
and fair.").
27. "Some of the cases justified nonenforcement of sister state judgments by
relying on natural law notions of fairness, laying the foundation for the Supreme Court's
use of the due process clause in Pennoyer v. Neff." John N. Drobak, The Federalism
Theme in PersonalJurisdiction,68 IOWA L. REV. 1015, 1023 (1983). "Traditionally,
equity would not direct a party to take actions outside its territorial jurisdiction .... The
availability of equitable relief also was hedged by doctrines of fairness and justice."
JOHN J. COUND ETAL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 497-98 (8th ed. 2000);
see also 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, § 1064, at 334.
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realization that the phrase had its roots in equity leads to the conclusion that the
InternationalShoe test is one of doing fairness in the individual case. Yet that
realization is not a revelation, as that reading of the test is apparent from the
plain meaning of the words of the test itself.2" So tracing the test back into
equity yields little of substance.
This Part has attempted to discover the origins of the words and phrases
used in the InternationalShoe test. The result was some interesting speculation,
but no definitive lineage was found beyond the conclusion that a major portion
of the test traces back into traditional equity jurisprudence. The next Part of this
Article attempts to interpret the words of the test itself.
IMl. THE INTERNATIONAL SHOE TEST AND ANALYSIS
A. The Test as OriginallyStated
The Supreme Court, in 1945, decided to end incrementalism in the
constitutional supervision of exercises of state personal jurisdiction by
abandoning the rule of Pennoyerv. Neff,29 which required that a nonconsenting
nonresident be served within the boundaries of the state, in favor of the brandnew rule of InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington,a° which allowed a state to
assert jurisdiction over a defendant served out of state in appropriate
circumstances. To determine what circumstances are appropriate is to state the
new rule. Looking to the language of the opinion, we find what has come to be
called the minimum contacts test:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice."31
This of course is the language that has since been universally accepted as the law
of personal jurisdiction.
Another statement of the new test-in differing language-is found four
pages later in the opinion:
It is evident that these operations establish sufficient contacts or ties
with the state of the forum to make it reasonable and just according to

28. See infra text accompanying notes 45-46.
29. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
30. 326 U.S. 310 (1945); see supra note 7.
31. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
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our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice to permit
the state to enforce the obligations which appellant has incurred there.
Hence we cannot say that the maintenance of the present suit in the
State of Washington involves an unreasonable or undue procedure.32
One can quickly compare the two statements to see that the former refers to
"minimum contacts," and the latter refers to "sufficient contacts or ties." The
former refers to "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice," and the
latter refers to "our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice."
The most interesting difference is that the latter inserts "reasonable and just" into
the middle of the phrase.
While the former statement is clearly the correct one to identify as the new
law in the area because it is included in the Court's discussion of the law instead
of its later factual application,33 we can gain insight from the latter statement.
First, even though the Court creates the "minimum contacts test" as the law, it
does not even use the term to decide the case. Instead, it mentions "sufficient
contacts or ties." 34 This should give us pause in identifying "minimum contacts"
as a term of art. Second, even though the new law is that a defendant must have
minimum contacts "such that" jurisdiction does not offend "traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice,"35 four pages later jurisdiction over this
defendant is found to be "reasonable and just," with "fair play and substantial
justice" in a subordinate clause.36
Even casting aside the second statement of the test as being one of factual
application rather than law, we find two additional, alternative statements of
what the law requires-and both are in the law section of the opinion. First, after
rejecting the old "presence" test, the Court indicates that the "demands of due
process... may be met by such contacts of the corporation with the state of the
forum as make it reasonable" to require defense of a suit there. 7 Here
"minimum contacts" is replaced by "such contacts," and "fair play and
substantial justice" is supplanted by "reasonable." Second, at another point in
the opinion the Court says, "Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather
upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly

32. Id. at 320.
33. The Court's opinion in InternationalShoe can be dissected cleanly. Following
an opening paragraph stating the issues to be decided, id. at 311, the Court states the facts
of the case, id. at 311-15, sketches out defendant/appellant's argument, id. at 315-16,
states the law, id. at 316-19, applies the facts of the case to the new law, id. at 320-21,
and reaches its conclusion, id. at 321-22.
34. Id. at 320.
35. Id. at 316.
36. Id. at 320.
37. Id. at 317.
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Here, "minimum contacts" is replaced entirely
administration of the laws ... ,,3"
by "quality and nature of the activity," and "fair play and substantial justice"
becomes "fair and orderly administration of the laws."
Thus, the opinion states or applies the new law no fewer than four times,
and uses different language every time. One can hardly believe that the Court
can create a brand-new test for a major area of the law and then backtrack on it
three times in the next four pages. Either this is truly sloppy writing or the Court
never intended for "minimum contacts" to be a precise legal test. All of this
lends credence to the conclusion that the InternationalShoe test is in its essence
simply a test of reasonableness or fairness.39
Some commentators have argued the new test was nothing new, as
"minimum contacts" requires the same analysis as the rejected tests of
"presence" or "doing business."40 This Article does not follow that lead.
Because InternationalShoe uses new language to create a new test for personal
jurisdiction, the Article takes the Court's efforts at face value, and proceeds to
analyze the new "minimum contacts" test.
B. Analysis of the Original "Minimum Contacts" Test
What test has the Court wrought? Two observations are fair and accurate.
First, the Court created a unitary test. Although in recent years the Court has
claimed the test to be two-part, or even multi-part," the original, unpolished
InternationalShoe test is clearly a one-step, unitary test. A court is not required
to find "minimum contacts" and "fair play and substantial justice." Neither is
a court required to find "minimum contacts" or "fair play and substantial
justice." The opinion requires a court find "minimum contacts with [the state]
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice."' 42 The connective words "such that" meld the test

38. Id. at 319.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 45-49.
40. Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal
Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 19,
55 (1990); Joseph J. Kalo, Jurisdictionas an Evolutionary Process: The Development
of QuasiIn Rem and In PersonamPrinciples,1978 DuKEL.J. 1147, 1184-85; Kevin C.
McMunigal, Desert, Utility, and Minimum Contacts: Toward a Mixed Theory of
PersonalJurisdiction, 108 YALE L.J. 189, 201 (1998) ("In retrospect, the Court seems
simply to have replaced the formalist abstractions of presence and consent with a

different abstraction: contacts."); John B. Oakley, The Pitfalls of "Hint and Run"
History: A Critique ofProfessorBorchers's "Limited View" of Pennoyer v. Neff, 28
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 591, 597 (1995); Developments in the Law, supra note 8, at 923.
41. See infra Part IV.
42. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (emphasis added). This is the generally accepted

test from InternationalShoe. Even in the other three variants of the test in the opinion,
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into a single, unitary whole.4" This conclusion is reinforced by the language on
the next page of the Court's opinion: the demands of due process "may be met
by such contacts ... as make it reasonable ... to require the corporation to
defend the particular suit which is brought there."" In other words, the contacts
must make jurisdiction reasonable, just as under the initial statement, the
minimum contacts must make the exercise of jurisdiction consonant with fair
play and substantial justice. That is a unitary test.
Second, what is the test? Fairness. Dressed up in fancy word clothing, the
test is nothing more-and nothing less-than that a court should consider all the
circumstances of the case and decide whether jurisdiction over the defendant by
that state in that case strikes the court as fair. All four of the Court's
formulations of the test are variants of the same fairness theme.4 Others have
agreed that the sum of the International Shoe test, whether it is labeled the
minimum contacts test or something else, is basic fairness.46 Probably the most

the test is unitary. See supra notes 30-39 and accompanying text.
43. Cf.McMunigal, supra note 40, at 226; Linda J. Silberman, "Two Cheers "for
International Shoe (and None for Asahi): An Essay on the Fiftieth Anniversary of
International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 755, 759 (1995).
44. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317.
45. The Court states four variants of the same test. The defendant must "have
certain minimum contacts" such as not to "offend... fair play and substantial justice."
Id. at 316. Due process demands "such contacts.., as make it reasonable." Id. at 317.
Due process depends on the "quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and
orderly administration of the laws." Id. at 319. This defendant established "sufficient
contacts or ties ... to make it reasonable and just according to .. .fair play and
substantial justice." Id. at 320; see supra text accompanying notes 30-38.
46. Borchers, supra note 12, at 580; Richard B. Cappalli, Locke as the Key: A
Unifying and Coherent Theory ofin Personam Jurisdiction, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 97,
103-04 (1992); Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Three Deaths of "State Sovereignty" and the
Curse ofAbstraction in the Jurisprudence ofPersonal Jurisdiction, 58 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 699, 709-10 (1983) ("Chief Justice Stone's calculus did not measure fairness
directly, according to the forum's convenience to a given defendant, but only indirectly,
through measures of defendant-forum contacts designed to ensure that a forum would be
at least minimally 'fair' as between the parties. . . ."); Rex R. Perschbacher, Minimum
Contacts Reapplied: Mr. Justice Brennan Has It His Way in Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 1986 ARIz.ST. L.J. 585, 587; Developments in the Law, supra note 8, at 918;
Michael D. Wellington, Comment, Minimum Contacts Confused and
Reconfused- Variations on a Theme by International Shoe-Or, Is this Trip Necessary?,
7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 304, 310 (1970); cf Martin H. Redish & Eric J. Beste, Personal
Jurisdiction and the Global Resolution of Mass Tort Litigation: Defining the
Constitutional Boundaries, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 917, 934 (1995), where the authors
write of "the frank and open use of a balancing process" as a "pragmatic calculus [that]
was given the title 'minimum contacts."'
Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952), decided
only seven years later, with five of the International Shoe Justices still on the Court,
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unfortunate error in reading InternationalShoe is concluding that the opinion
states a new "minimum contacts" test for personal jurisdiction. A far more
accurate reading is that the opinion creates a new "fair play" test.
Perhaps an even better summary of the test would be to say that the exercise
of jurisdiction by the state over the defendant in a particular case must be
"reasonable." Indeed, the opinion itself states that the contacts must make
jurisdiction "reasonable," with no reference to "fair play,"47 and in its only
factual application uses both concepts-with reasonable first and fair play
second.4" Also, others have summarized the test as one of reasonableness.49 And
yet in the end, that alternative formulation makes no difference. What is fair is
reasonable, and what is reasonable is fair. The test is the same.
Why then would the Court, through Chief Justice Stone, not simply say the
test is reasonableness or fairness? Various reasons come to mind. First, the
prospect of replacing the rigid, time-honored rule of Pennoyer with a test of
"we'll let you know what strikes us as fair" must have been particularly
problematical. Chief Justice Stone likely dressed up the test with his newlycreated phrase "minimum contacts" and added quotations and references to
precedent for "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" as the
solution. Second, to say a rule of law is "fairness" is hardly law at all.
Jurisdiction turning on factual fairness-just as negligence turning on reasonable
conduct-is more appropriately decided by a jury than a judge. Juries are not,

states, "The essence of the issue here, at the constitutional level, is a like one of general
fairness to the corporation." See also Donatelli v. Nat'l Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459,
462 (1st Cir. 1990).
47. Int'lShoe, 326 U.S. at 317.

48. The defendant's "operations establish sufficient contacts or ties.., to make it
reasonable and just according to our traditional conception of fair play and substantial
justice" to permit a suit. Id. at 320.
49.
A defendant doing an act in a state, or causing effects in a state by doing an act
elsewhere, is subject to jurisdiction in the state unless jurisdiction is "unreasonable."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 36 (1971). What is likely the first
commentary on the case opined, "The practical test now laid down seeks to determine
...
do the contacts of the corporation with the forum state make it reasonable to require
the corporation to defend a suit brought there." Recent Decisions, supranote 8, at 445.
Lower court judges have recognized this as well. E.g., Hutter N.Trust v. Door County
Chamber of Commerce, 403 F.2d 481, 484 (7th Cir. 1968) ("Whether sufficient
minimum contacts exist cannot be answered by applying a formula or rule of thumb, but
by ascertaining what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of the particular
situation."); S. Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir. 1968)
("But 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice' is hardly a precise and
definitive standard; itgives us no more basis for judging than the highly amorphous and
ultimately subjective standard of reasonableness."); LaMarca v. Pak-Mor Mfg. Co., 735
N.E.2d 883, 888 (N.Y. 2000).
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however, available on preliminary motions to dismiss. Third, Chief Justice
Stone must have been aware that creation of an apparent rule of law was vital to
future stability in the area. Courts and commentators can respect a rule of law,
even one that is far less than it seems, but not a claim that the Court will know
fairness when it sees it. 50
The lone dissenter in International Shoe, Justice Hugo Black, was
concerned in two ways with the new test: vagueness, and usurpation of power
by the judiciary at the expense of states and other branches of the federal
government. 1 As to the former concern, he complained that the Court had
"announced vague Constitutional criteria" and "introduced uncertain elements
confusing the simple pattern" by its new "elastic standards." 52 He was correct.
The years have proved him even more prescient.5 3 The words of the new "test"
'
have been described on a roughly escalating scale of criticism as "vague,"54
55
56
"ambiguous," merely a "guide" to the facts, only a "statement of policy,""
more "an art than a science,"" a "manipulable" test of "uncertainty and
unpredictability, 59 "vessels of unknown size,"6 ° and "empty vessels."'" The

50. Justice Potter Stewart received much negative commentary over the years for
writing honestly of obscenity that "I know it when I see it." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S.
184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
Early commentary on InternationalShoe was generally favorable. See, e.g., Note,
The Growth ofthe International Shoe Doctrine, 16 U. CHI. L. REv. 523,533 (1949) ("The

broad standards of the InternationalShoe case may be expected to prevail in a mature
legal system."); Recent Decisions, supranote 8,at 445 ("Certainly the standards adopted
by the Supreme Court provide a realistic approach to this jurisdictional problem.").
51. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 323 (Black, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 325 (Black, J., dissenting).
53. See infra Parts IV-V.
54. Friedrich K. Juenger, AmericanJurisdiction: A Story ofComparative Neglect,

65 U.COLO.L. REV. 1, 14 (1993) ("Obviously, the term 'minimum contacts' is far too
vague to guide the decision of real-life cases. Nor does it guarantee fair decisions.").
55. Jay, supra note 6, at 473.
56. 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, § 1067, at 399.
57. Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In
PersonamJurisdictionofState Courtsfrom Pennoyer to Denckla; A Review, 25 U. CHI.
L. REV. 569, 591 (1958). Kurland also asserts, "The InternationalShoe case, like Erie

R.R. v. Tompkins, served rather to destroy existent doctrine than to establish new criteria
for the Supreme Court and other courts to follow." Id. at 586.
58. Donatelli v. Nat'l Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459, 468 n.7 (1st Cir. 1990).
59. McMunigal, supra note 40, at 218.
60. Kalo, supra note 40, at 1184.
61. "The primary error was, of course, the emptiness of the famous language

'certain minimum contacts' so that the assertion of state court power is 'fair play and
substantial justice.' I call it 'language' because it is too vacuous to be considered
'doctrine' or 'norm' or even 'general norm.' ... [T]he opinion means that the contacts
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Supreme Court itself has attempted to sharpen the test several times, and the
lower courts in turn have devised many glosses on the test in their efforts to
interpret and apply it.62 A fair summary of the InternationalShoe test is that it
is a statement of conclusion rather than reasoning. 6a The famous minimum
contacts test is no more than an ipse dixit in each case.
Justice Black also objected because the new test placed too much discretion
in the hands ofjudges to invalidate state policies. While he particularly objected
to the possibility of curtailment of a state's regulatory powers over corporations
operating within its borders, he also complained that the new test would allow
judges to strike down a state's regulations based on their personal ideas of what
is "justice" or what is "undesirable":
There is a strong emotional appeal in the words "fair play", "justice",
and "reasonableness." But they were not chosen by those who wrote
the original Constitution or the Fourteenth Amendment .... No one,
not even those who most feared a democratic government, ever
formally proposed that courts should be given power to invalidate
legislation under any such elastic standards.... For application of this
natural law concept, whether under the terms "reasonableness",
"justice", or "fair play", makes judges the supreme arbiters of the
country's laws and practices .... "I see hardly any limit but the sky to
the invalidating of those rights if they happen to strike a majority of
this Court as for any reason undesirable.""
On this point too, Justice Black was correct.
The irony is that the Court sacrificed predictability for fairness and now the
result is only what one judge--or a majority of judges-concludes is fair in an
individual case. The minimum contacts test certainly does not guarantee "fair"
decisions. Instead, it guarantees that each case will turn on what one judge
thinks fair. While this does harken back to the test's roots in equity, which
allowed the chancellor to do justice on the facts of the case, it hardly qualifies as
I

must be sufficient in order for jurisdiction to be fair.... We can also quickly dismiss any
idea that the phrases 'fair play' and 'substantial justice' have different meanings.
Nothing in InternationalShoe or its progeny offers any ground for distinguishing 'fair'
and 'just.' They seem to be two identical empty vessels waiting for contents." Cappalli,
supra note 46, at 103-04.
62. See infra Parts IV-V. To this point, this Article is discussing the test as
announced in InternationalShoe, not the later developments.
63. Kurland, supra note 57, at 623.
64. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 325-26 (1945) (Black, J.,
dissenting). The last sentence is from Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1930)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
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a rule of law. Even in equity, the law depends on the appearance of doing
justice, not individual whim.6"
One might think the accretion of decisions over the years would lessen or
even eliminate this problem, but precedents have helped little to solidify the rule,
because the test is personal predilection, not law.'6 One of the Supreme Court's
more recent personal jurisdiction decisions presents a perfect example. In
HelicopterosNacionalesde Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,the Court decided whether
the exercise of state court jurisdiction satisfied the InternationalShoe fairness
test.67 The eleven-page opinion, authored by Justice Harry Blackmun, prompted
a ten-page dissent authored by Justice William Brennan. An accurate summary
of the two opinions is that Justice Blackmun said, "I think jurisdiction is unfair,"
and Justice Brennan said, "I think jurisdiction is fair." Helicopterosis an object
lesson that in the absence of a meaningful rule of law, a judge can justify any
result that seems reasonable to him or her.68 Frankly, I like what some judges
think is reasonable, and am mystified and mortified by what other judges think
is reasonable. In the Court's most recent statement on personal jurisdiction,
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that "traditional standards of fair play and
substantial justice" can be found in "traditional doctrines in this country,
including current state-court practices"; he objected to the concurrence's
proposed application of a fairness standard because it would require the test to
be reformulated as "our notions of fair play and substantial justice."69 Justice
Scalia is correct that the jurisdictional standard might well be recast as "our
notions." He is wrong that the concept of "traditional notions" is any more firm.
Judges have had, from the day of International Shoe, largely unbounded
discretion to uphold or to reject a state's assertion ofjurisdiction. 0 Another, less

65. Sir Thomas More expressed well the need that justice appear to be done:
If you take away laws and leave everything free to the judges, they will either
command or forbid nothing, in which case judges will be useless, or they will
rule as their own nature leads and order whatever pleases them, in which case
the people will be in no wise more free but worse off, in a condition of
slavery, since they will have to submit, not to settled and certain laws, but to

uncertain whims changing from day to day. And this is bound to happen even
under the best judges ....
2 THE REPORTS OF SIR JOHN SPELMAN 81 (J. H. Baker ed., 1978).

66.
67.
68.
How the

See infra text accompanying notes 67-70.
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,409 (1984).
See Leslie W. Abramson, Clarifying "Fair Play and SubstantialJustice":
Courts Apply the Supreme Court Standard for Personal Jurisdiction, 18
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 441,447-51 (1991); Heiser, supra note 6, at 927.
69. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 623 (1990).
70. See Stephen Goldstein, Federalism and Substantive Due Process: A
Comparative and Historical Perspective on International Shoe and its Progeny, 28 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 965, 985 (1995); Silberman, supra note 43, at 755.
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palatable, way to state the matter is that judges have almost absolute power in the
area. That is exactly what Justice Black feared.
C. Effects of the New Test
During October Term, 1945, the Supreme Court must have been eager to
refashion the law of personal jurisdiction. In the sixty-eight years since its
decision in Pennoyer,the Court had revisited the area at least fifty-three times.7
As a consequence, the Court replaced Pennoyer, and its many modifications,
with InternationalShoe.
The new test has succeeded over the years, if the standard of success is the
number of times the Court has felt the need to return to the area. In the fiftyeight year reign of International Shoe, the Court has revisited the area of
personal jurisdiction only twenty times." Even more remarkable is that the
Court has not returned to the minimum contacts test for sixteen years. 7 3 The

Court has cleared its personal jurisdiction docket.
The price of this success to the national judicial system has been huge.
Adaptation of the rigid rule of Pennoyer to unexpected facts could come only
from the Court that created the rule. Adaptation of the flaccid rule of
InternationalShoe to the facts of a case is almost never needed as the basic rule
is that the court should do fairness on the facts. Consequently, the Supreme
Court has eliminated its "torrent" of once-a-year decisions by requiring lower
courts to decide thousands of cases annually.74 What a trial judge, or even an
appellate panel, will think is fair is often unpredictable. 7 ' Because the decision
is unpredictable, potential plaintiffs are encouraged to try their luck in choice of
forum, and defendants are encouraged to try their luck in challenging that forum
choice." Both are discouraged from settling.77 The Supreme Court itself has not

71. Cameron & Johnson, supranote 8, at 785 n.57. One commentator refers to a
"torrent" of opinions attempting to round out the law in the area. Borchers, supranote
40, at 43.
72. Cameron & Johnson, supra note 8, at 785 n.57, 817.

73. The last Supreme Court decision addressing the minimum contacts test was
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). The Court's later
decision in Burnham, 495 U.S. at 604, involved service within a state, not long-arm
jurisdiction.
74. See infra note 113.
75. E.g., Borchers, supra note 40, at 102 ("Worse than the strange results, however,

is the lack of predictability and the resources consumed litigating the most elementary of
questions: Where can I file suit?"); Juenger, supra note 54, at 14 ("far too vague to guide
the decisions of real-life cases"); Perschbacher, supra note 46, at 629 ("broad principles
using vague terms that are difficult to apply in specific cases"); see infra note 116.
76. See Alex W. Albright, In Personam Jurisdiction: A Confused and
InappropriateSubstitutefor Forum Non Conveniens, 71 TEX. L. REV. 351, 395 (1992);
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been able to step back entirely and on occasion has felt the need to clarify and
inject some predictability into the test--or perhaps just to assert a different
understanding of what is fair on the facts of a case." The lower courts have
clearly demonstrated that they need more certainty, predictability, and ease of
application in the area by placing a plethora of glosses on the test. 9 All of these
results should have been foreseeable to the Court at the time it decided
InternationalShoe.

IV. THE TEST CANNOT ENDURE: DEVELOPMENT BY THE
SUPREME COURT
Nearly six decades have passed since the Supreme Court established the
minimum contacts/fair play test. One might expect that a court, having created
a test that is more exhortation than law, would later attempt to make it more
certain and predictable. Indeed, the InternationalShoe opinion itself offers a
grid created from two variables to assist the decision of future cases."0

Robert C. Casad, PersonalJurisdictionin Federal Question Cases, 70 TEX. L. REV.
1589, 1593 (1992) ("Because outcomes are often difficult to predict, parties are inclined
to litigate the question of personal jurisdiction in every case where the issue is not crystal
clear."); infra note 113. One commentator concluded, "Judged by its internal costs, our
current law of personal jurisdiction is a disaster." Borchers, supranote 12, at 582.
77. E.g., Borchers, supra note 12, at 584.
78. See infra Part IV.
79. See infra Part V.
80. While in form writing of the discarded "presence" test for jurisdiction over a
corporation, the InternationalShoe Court offers the first guidance for application of the
new test. The opinion mentions four possible combinations of two variables. Int'l Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317-18 (1945). The first variable is whether the
defendant's contacts with a state have been continuous and systematic or have been
single or isolated. Id. at 317. The second variable is whether the plaintiff's claim arises
out of the contact(s) with the state. Id. Accordingly, the four possible combinations are
(1) defendant has systematic and continuous contacts with the state and plaintiff's claim
arises from them, (2) defendant has systematic and continuous contacts with the state and
plaintiffs claim arises elsewhere, (3) defendant has only a single contact or isolated
contacts with the state and plaintiff s claim arises from it, and (4) defendant has only a
single contact or isolated contacts with the state and plaintiff s claim arises elsewhere.
The Court suggests strongly that personal jurisdiction will exist, i.e., the minimum
contacts test will be satisfied, in the first three situations but not the fourth. Id. at 317-18.
These combinations have been used in several state cases as a guide to decision.
See infra note 143.
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A. Developments in the Minimum Contacts/FairPlay Test
1945 to Present

The Court has attempted to clarify the test and its application in nineteen
cases since 1945. These opinions expound and expand on the test, but never
express any interest in expunging it. After six decades of "development," the
minimum contacts test remains the linchpin of personal jurisdiction.8
Yet instead of crystalizing the law in the area, these decisions have made
the law of personal jurisdiction more fantastic. The minimum contacts test today
is no more certain and predictable than it was in 1945, and may well be worse. 2
This Part will explore that phenomenon by highlighting only a few of the Court's
attempts to solidify the law of personal jurisdiction. It will not follow the usual
pattern of analyzing and commenting on each of the twenty decisions in turn.
That has already been well done.83 This Part instead plucks from the stream of
the Court's judicial process four decisions that are important in terms of attempts
to contour and reshape the minimum contacts test. After highlighting these four
cases, the Article turns to an analysis of the status of the law of personal
jurisdiction today.
The first noteworthy development is the little-heralded decision in Travelers
Health Ass 'n v. Virginia,4 decided only five years after InternationalShoe.
Justice Black, the lone dissenter in InternationalShoe, wrote the opinion,
deciding that Virginia could assert personal jurisdiction over nonresident
insurance companies selling certificates to Virginia residents."5 The opinion
gives the first guidance as to some considerations a court should use in deciding
a jurisdiction challenge, which is an improvement over the inchoate "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice." In Travelers Health, the Court
considered not only "the contacts and ties of appellants with Virginia residents,"

81. Cebik, supra note 12, at 5-6. Sometimes this is true more in word than in
practice. For example, in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985),
the Court announced, "[T]he constitutional touchstone remains whether the defendant
purposefully established 'minimum contacts' in the forum State." Yet the initial portion
of the opinion states, "The question presented is whether this exercise of long-arm
jurisdiction offended 'traditional conception[s] of fair play and substantial justice'
embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 464. Two
things should be noted here: (1) the Court's call of the issue in the case does not even
mention "minimum contacts," and (2)the opinion quotes the test formulation from the
application section of InternationalShoe rather than the law section. See supra text

accompanying notes 30-36.
82. See infra Part IV.B.
83. See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 40, at 56-87; Heiser, supranote 6, at 918-29;
Kurland, supra note 57, at 586-623.
84. 339 U.S. 643 (1950).

85. Id. at 646-47.
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but also the "state's interest in faithful observance of the certificate obligations,"
the interest of plaintiffs in having a convenient local forum, and the interests of
witnesses in being able to testify in a convenient forum.86 Justice Black blended
these additional considerations into the mix with only the simple notation that
they "have been given great weight in applying the doctrine of forum non
conveniens," and then concluded Virginia's assertion of personal jurisdiction "is
consistent with 'fair play and substantial justice' and is not offensive to the Due
Process Clause. ' 7
This opinion is completely consistent with InternationalShoe. The ultimate
legal conclusion was that jurisdiction was fair-with only a passing nod to
"minimum contacts." 88 While the additional considerations the Court used to
reach a decision on "fair play and substantial justice" were not made explicit in
InternationalShoe, certainly they would be among the factors any court would
take into account in deciding whether jurisdiction in an individual case
represents "fair play and substantial justice." Travelers Health remains of
interest today because it is the first opinion to make consideration of such factors
explicit.
Eight years after TravelersHealth the Court decided Hanson v. Denckla.89

The Court emphasized that the trend toward broader assertions ofjurisdiction did
not "herald[] the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction
of state courts" which are not based on convenience but instead "are a
consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States."9

86. Id. at 648-49; see also McMunigal, supra note 40, at 196-97.
87. Travelers Health, 339 U.S. at 649.
88. Id. Perkins v. Benguet ConsolidatedMining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), is also

of interest since it was written only one year after InternationalShoe. The opinion states,
"The essence of the issue here, at the constitutional level, is a like one of general fairness
to the corporation. Appropriate tests for that are discussed in InternationalShoe Co. v.
Washington." Id. at 445.

89. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
90. Id. at 251. This language is the high water mark of the philosophy carried over
from Pennoyer that state jurisdictional limits are based in whole or in part on the
sovereign rights and limits of the states. See infra Part VII. The other case highlighting
the sovereignty of the states is World- Wide Volkswagen Corp.v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286

(1980). That case, while not contributing new ideas or language to the minimum
contacts/fair play test (and so not included in text here), is important in the history of the
minimum contacts test for another reason. From the opening of extraterritorial
jurisdiction in InternationalShoe in 1945, and over the next three-and-one-half decades,
the long arms of the state courts had grown longer and longer. While the states may have
been slow at first to realize the extent of their new power, by 1980 they were asserting
their reach into other states with a vengeance. Seemingly each new decision found
jurisdiction on fewer contacts with the state. The trend of the law of personal jurisdiction
was savagely expansionary. World-Wide Volkswagen brought this trend to a screeching
halt. The Supreme Court showed it was serious about state boundaries and examining
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Consequently, said the Court, the necessary contact of a defendant with a state
must be found in "some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws.""' Here we have the next assistance to lower
courts as they struggle to decide what is fair: a defendant must purposefully
(voluntarily) avail itself of the benefits and protections of the laws of a state for
that state to assert jurisdiction over it. Presumably, when a defendant
purposefully avails itself of entry into a state, it can reasonably anticipate being
haled into a court there, so this idea in Hanson is likely the genesis of the
statement in later opinions that a defendant's expectations of being haled into
court in a state are meaningful.9 2 Because anticipation of a possible suit
inseparably follows purposeful entry into a state, the guidance that a defendant
must expect being haled into court in a state adds nothing beyond a recognition
that the defendant has voluntarily availed itself of the benefits and protections of
state laws, which in turn is no more than a particularized aspect of fairness.93
While Hanson and its progeny celebrate state sovereignty and emphasize
purposeful availment, the next major development denigrates state sovereignty
and emphasizes convenience as the overriding concern. Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz 94 is important primarily because it fractures the unitary International
Shoe test into halves: a minimum contacts half and a fairness half.
The BurgerKing opinion, authored by Justice Brennan, began analysis by
collecting precedents in an attempt to give meaning to "minimum contacts."9 5
The opinion summarized these precedents, stating that minimum contacts are
satisfied when a "defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum state."9 It even asserted that "the
constitutional touchstone remains whether the defendant purposefully established
' The important portion of the opinion
'minimum contacts' in the forum State."97
was not, however, about minimum contacts. Instead, it was the following
language:

the defendant's contacts with the state on a case-by-case basis. The outer limits of state
jurisdiction based on minimum contacts was reached. Pre-World-Wide Volkswagen,
plaintiffs won a large majority of the jurisdictional challenges. Post-World-Wide
Volkswagen, defendants win half of the jurisdictional challenges. For the two-plus
decades after World-Wide Volkswagen, all decisions have become fact-bound.
91. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.
92. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297; Kulko v. Superior Court, 436
U.S. 84, 97-98 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977).
93. See Jay, supranote 6, at 466.
94. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).

95. Id. at 471-75.
96. Id. at 475 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
97. Id. at 474; see supra note 81.
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Once it has been decided that a defendant purposefully established
minimum contacts within the forum State, these contacts may be
considered in light of other factors to determine whether the assertion
of personal jurisdiction would comport with "fair play and substantial
justice."

. .

. Thus courts in "appropriate case[s]" may evaluate "the

burden on the defendant," "the forum State's interest in adjudicating
the dispute," "the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and
effective relief," "the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining
the most efficient resolution of controversies," and the "shared interest
of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies."98
As a result, a court hearing a jurisdictional challenge must address two
issues: minimum contacts, plus fair play and substantial justice. "Minimum
contacts" means some sort of purposeful availment of the benefits and
protections of the forum state, which is essentially the analysis of Hanson. "Fair
play and substantial justice" refers to the five-step consideration of fairness that
was begun in Travelers Health.99 The use of these five considerations is not
surprising because many precedent cases had mentioned one or more of them."'°
Indeed, the opinion places each of the five considerations into quotation marks
to demonstrate that each has support in precedent. Nor is it surprising that
Justice Brennan creates what amounts to a two-step test: he advocated such a
sharp change in personal jurisdiction standards in earlier dissents.' What is

98. Id. at 476-77 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 292 (1980); Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945)).
99. Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950). Travelers Health
mentions the interests of the plaintiff, the interests of the forum state, and the
convenience interest of witnesses. See supra text accompanying notes 84-88. A
comparison with the BurgerKing list of considerations shows the convenience interest
of witnesses has been dropped, but the other two interests have been retained and
expanded, and three additional considerations have been added.
100. For example, World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292, mentions all five as
considerations in reaching a decision on 'reasonableness' or 'fairness."'
101. In World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 299 (Brennan, J., dissenting), Justice
Brennan says in dissent, "[T]he standards enunciated by [InternationalShoe and its
progeny] may already be obsolete as constitutional boundaries." He argues that the cases
have been too concerned with a defendant's contacts with a state, and the law should be
that "minimum contacts must exist'among the parties,the contested transaction, and the
forum State.' The contacts between any two of these should not be determinative." Id.
at 309-10 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 220
(1977)).
Some commentators had previously analyzed the test as being two-fold: a power
test and a fairness test. See Kevin Clermont, Restating TerritorialJurisdictionand
Venue for State and FederalCourts, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 411, 413-29 (1981); Bruce
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surprising is that he gathered the votes of five other Justices to sign on to his
previously idiosyncratic view that the test should be fractured into two parts.
This division of the test for personal jurisdiction into two branches, a power
branch and a fairness branch, was greeted with no applause and a loud round
of boos."0 2
The Court seems to be committed to the division. Two years after Burger
King, in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,"3 the Justices split on the

constitutional validity of an assertion ofjurisdiction based on placing a product
into the stream of commerce. Yet the bifurcation of the minimum contacts test
did not split the Court at all: the Justices were unanimous in considering
minimum contacts and fair play separately. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor,
writing the opinion, cleaved the two parts cleanly. In Part II.A of the opinion,

Posnak, A Uniform Approach to Judicial Jurisdiction After World-Wide and the
Abolition of the "Gotcha" Theory, 30 EMORY L.J. 729, 730 (1981); Winton D. Woods,
Pennoyer's Demise: Personal JurisdictionAfter Shaffer and Kulko and a Modest

PredictionRegarding World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 20 ARiz. L. REv.
861, 881-82 (1978) (splitting first part into two for three-part test); Comment, Contacts
andFairness:A Dual Testfor PersonalJurisdiction,11 STAN. L. REV. 344, 345 (1959).
102. Critical analysis approaches from many directions. One criticism is that the
split of the test is neither acknowledged nor justified by the Court. McMunigal, supra
note 40, at 226. Another criticism is that the separate reasonableness part "tends to
suggest a free-form 'fairness' inquiry where additional criteria such as choice of law,
over-all convenience, and specific individual characteristics might be considered." Linda
Silberman, Reflections on Burnham v. Superior Court: Toward Presumptive Rules of
JurisdictionandImplicationsfor Choice ofLaw, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 569, 581 (1991). One
commentator argues that the two parts of the test merely repeat each other. Jay Conison,
What Does Due ProcessHave To Do with Jurisdiction,46 RUTGERS L. REv. 1071, 1200
(1994). Others complain that the five considerations assist the court no more than "fair
play and substantial justice." Borchers, supra note 40, at 77; Heiser, supra note 6, at
925-26; Bruce Posnak, The CourtDoesn 't Know its Asahifrom its Wortman: A Critical
View ofthe ConstitutionalConstraintson Jurisdictionand Choice ofLaw, 41 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 875, 891-95 (1990).

Others attack the Court's new analysis on the ground that it allows courts to make
arbitrary decisions and reach any result desired in an individual case. E.g., Abramson,
supra note 68, at 447-51; Ralph U. Whitten, The ConstitutionalLimitations on StateCourtJurisdiction:A Historical-InterpretiveReexaminationofthe FullFaithandCredit
and Due Process Clauses (PartTwo), 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 735, 845 (1988). This

criticism I doubt, however, as it implies that only since Burger King have courts been
allowed to decide on idiosyncratic notions of fairness. They have been free to do so since
InternationalShoe. See supra text accompanying notes 64-70.
Even prior to Burger King, commentators criticized World-Wide Volkswagen for

considering fairness factors separate from minimum contacts. Jay, supra note 6, at 463
(stating that "minimum contacts" separated from "fair play and substantialj ustice" means
little).
103. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
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she concluded that placing a product into the stream of commerce does not
satisfy "minimum contacts," and in Part II.B she further concluded that the
exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant does not satisfy "traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice."' 4 Concurring, Justice Brennan argued that
placing a product into the stream of commerce would satisfy the requirement of
minimum contacts even though the facts of the case do not establish "fair play
and substantial justice."'' 5 In other words, jurisdiction cannot be asserted if it is
unfair even though it meets the minimum contacts test. 0 6 Justice John Paul
Stevens, in concurrence, agreed that jurisdiction would be "unreasonable and
unfair," but he did not join Part II.A of the O'Connor opinion, in part because the
Court should not have even considered minimum contacts! He wrote that "it is
not necessary to the Court's decision. An examination of minimum contacts is
not always necessary to determine whether a state court's assertion of personal
jurisdiction is constitutional."' 0 7
The last opinion is the most remarkable. Justice Stevens-and Justices
Byron White and Harry Blackmun, who signed his opinion-asserted that the
test for personal jurisdiction is two-part: (1) minimum contacts/purposeful
availment, and (2) reasonable and fair.' Each part is equally important. When
"fair play and substantial justice" is clearly not satisfied, they say a court engages
in dictum even to consider "minimum contacts.""' 9 In one sense, that view turns
the "minimum contacts test" completely onto its head; in another sense, it does
no more than apply the InternationalShoe test as it was originally intended, as
a simple test of fairness." 0
For sixteen years and counting, Asahi is the Court's final word on the test
for personal jurisdiction established in InternationalShoe.

104. Justice O'Connor's opinion is unanimous on the factual section, id.at 105-08,
musters only four votes for a discussion concluding that placing a product into the stream
of commerce does not establish "minimum contacts," id. at 108-13, and then gathers
eight votes for the view that assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant violates
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice," id. at 113-16.
105. Id. at 116 (Brennan, J., concurring).
106. "This is one of those rare cases in which 'minimum requirements inherent in
the concept of "fair play and substantial justice" . . . defeat the reasonableness of
jurisdiction even [though] the defendant has purposefully engaged in forum activities."'

Id. at 116 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 477-78 (1995)) (alterations in original).

107. Id. at 121 (Stevens, J., concurring). Despite refusing to consider minimum
contacts, Justice Stevens does opine that placing a product regularly into the stream of
commerce would satisfy purposeful availment. Id. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring).

108. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 121 (Stevens, J., concurring).
110. See supratext accompanying notes 45-49.
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B. The Residue: The Minimum Contacts/FairPlay Test Today
Since InternationalShoe created the minimum contacts/fair play test in
1945 for constitutional supervision of assertions of state court personal
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court and lower courts have labored to refine and
clarify the test. While a small minority of commentators have declared these
efforts a success,"' the1 2great majority of commentators have branded these
efforts a dismal failure.'
Decision-making in the individual case is no easier today than in 1945, so
the transactional costs of litigation on the threshold issue of personal jurisdiction
remain high: hundreds of appellate decisions with little or no precedential value
are rendered annually." 3 This is the inevitable result of the InternationalShoe
decision to require courts to engage in a pointillist process" 4 with little guidance

11. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Assessing Minimum Contacts: A Reply to
Professors Cameron and Johnson, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 863, 866 n.2 (1995);
Silberman, supra note 43.
112. See, e.g., Cappalli, supra note 46, at 109 (stating that the doctrine has mutated
"into its current, incoherent form"); Heiser, supra note 6, at 915 ("Despite these several
attempts at judicial fine-tuning, the doctrine today is unwieldy, incoherent, and
unpredictable."); Lewis, Jr., supra note 46, at 699 (decisions include notions "vague, and
counterproductive and unworkable"); Lawrence W. Moore, S.J., The Relatedness
Problem in Specific Jurisdiction,37 IDAHO L. REv. 583, 598 (2001) (stating that the
minimum contacts structure is now "architecturally grotesque"); Katherine C. Sheehan,
Predictingthe Future: PersonalJurisdictionfor the Twenty-First Century, 66 U. CIN.
L. REv. 385, 434 (1998) ("After fifty years of doctrinal development, the minimum
contacts test remains so fact-specific and uncertain that the outcome of thejurisdictional
analysis in any particular case is unpredictable.").
113. Statistics from state courts are difficult to obtain, and those statistics that exist
count only reported cases. These numbers severely underreport the number of personal
jurisdiction challenges because the heavy lifting on motions to dismiss for want of
personal jurisdiction occurs in unreported trial court decisions. Even so, one study
counts 3,900 reported cases from 1960 to 1983, and an additional 4,000 reported cases
from 1983 to 1992. ROBERT C. CASAD & WILLIAM B. RICHMAN, JURISDICTION INCIVIL
ACTIONS, at v, vii (3d ed. 1998). Another author conducts a computer-assisted search for
"minimum contacts" and discovers more than 2,000 reported decisions from 1990 to
1995. Russell J. Weintraub, A Map out ofthe PersonalJurisdictionLabyrinth, 28 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 531, 531 n.5 (1995). One article attempts to study forum-shopping
through personal jurisdiction challenges. The author looks at 975 cases from 1970 to
1994 that decide a "core personal jurisdiction issue." Michael E. Solimine, The Quiet
Revolution in PersonalJurisdiction,73 TUL. L. REv. 1, 24 (1998); see also Borchers,
supra note 40, at 102; Hazard, supra note 6, at 283; Heiser, supra note 6, at 917
("frequently litigated and hotly contested").
114. "The twenty years since [InternationalShoe] have been occupied by the
pointillist process of locating particular cases on one side of the line or the other."
Hazard, supra note 6, at 274. What was true when Professor Geoffrey Hazard wrote in
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other than instructing them to do what is fair."' What follows naturally is a
seemingly endless stream of decisions declaring either that jurisdiction on this
set of facts is fair or jurisdiction on that set of facts is unfair. The decisions have
little or no precedential value, so the decision stream flows unabated year after
year. The minimum contacts test was, and after six decades remains, a
conclusion rather than a reason.'
The problem is of course that the Supreme Court, and other courts under its
mandate, are trying to define the undefinable. When is personal jurisdiction in
a singular case consistent with "fair play and substantial justice"? Or to state the
question differently, what is fair in this case? That is not law. That is fiat. No
wonder the courts cannot define it with any precision.
Time and again, the Supreme Court opinions return to the basic question of
what is fair. "7 Even with the addition of at least five measures of "fair play and

1965 is true today.
115. See infra note 117. As one state court recognized of the transition from the
rule of Pennoyer to the rule of InternationalShoe, "[r]igid concepts have yielded to
fiction, and fiction has yielded to forthright and realistic considerations of fairness...
" Nelson v. Miller, 143 N.E.2d 673, 676 (I11.
1957).
116. See, e.g., LEA BRILMAYER, AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISDICTION IN THE
AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 34 (1986); Cameron & Johnson, supra note 8, at 836
("[T]he core of jurisdiction doctrine is unsettled."); Jay, supra note 6, at 475 ("More
fundamentally, the theory itself lacks any kind of sustaining foundation."); Kurland,
supra note 57, at 623 ("[N]ew doctrine to replace it has not been firmly fashioned. The
language of 'reasonableness' and 'fair play' to which the Court has resorted is rather a
statement of a conclusion than a reason."); McMunigal, supra note 40, at 199 ("[A]
central problem in making sense of current minimum contacts doctrine is the lack of a
clear foundation to anchor and explain its amorphous conglomeration of factors and use
of different temporal viewpoints."); Wendy Collins Perdue, Sin, Scandal,and Substantive
DueProcess: PersonalJurisdictionand PennoyerReconsidered,62 WASH. L. REv. 479,
479 (1987) ("Yet despite this growing body of case law, the doctrinal underpinnings
remain elusive."); Louise Weinberg, The Place of Trial and the Law Applied:
Overhauling ConstitutionalTheory, 59 U. COLO. L. REv. 67, 102 (1988) ("So quite
obviously we now have a body of rules without reasons."); cf Howard B. Stravitz,
Sayonarato Minimum Contacts: Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 39 S.C.
L. REv. 729, 805 (1988) ("[T]he current test is difficult to apply, and it is unlikely to
promote consistent and predictable results.").
117. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 487 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("In my opinion there is a significant element of unfairness in requiring a
franchisee to defend a case of this kind in the forum chosen by the franchisor."); Keeton
v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 775 (1984) ("That is, the contacts between
respondent and New Hampshire must be such that it is 'fair' to compel respondent to
defend a multistate lawsuit in New Hampshire .... "); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320,
329 (1980) ("In short, it cannot be said that the defendant engaged in any purposeful
activity related to the forum that would make the exercise of jurisdiction fair, just, or
reasonable ...."); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 300
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substantial justice" and the apparent split of the test into two parts, the test today
is essentially the same test that existed in 1945: a balancing test of fairness in the
individual case." 8
Not only has the Court over the past half-century been unable to create a
consistent, coherent law of personal jurisdiction, but also it has issued some
opinions that are flatly inconsistent with others. That situation may not seem
unusual, as other areas of the law show similar inconsistencies produced when
closely-divided factions on the Court shift back and forth in the majority from
case to case. The situation is not, however, one of differing views of what the
law should be. The rub is that opinions appear to be inconsistent from
inadvertence and confusion, not crafty analysis and writing." 9 Even more

(1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The clear focus in InternationalShoe was on fairness
and reasonableness .... The existence of contacts, so long as there were some, was

merely one way of giving content to the determination of fairness and reasonableness.");
id. at 285 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("It therefore seems to me not unreasonable.., to
uphold Oklahoma jurisdiction. ..."); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91, 100, 101

(1978) ("a sufficient connection between the defendant and the forum State to make it
fair to require defense of the action in the forum"; "these interests simply do not make
California a 'fair' forum"; "no intent to obtain or expectancy of receiving a
corresponding benefit in the State that would make fair the assertion of that State's
judicial jurisdiction"); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437,445 (1952)
("The essence of the issue here, at the constitutional level, is a like one of general fairness
to the corporation."); cf.Goldstein, supra note 70, at 982, 985 (criticizing the dissent in
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 487 (Stevens, J., dissenting), and the opinions signed by eight
of the nine Justices in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. SuperiorCourt, 480 U.S. 102 (1987),
on the grounds that they are based merely on what is fair).
118. "The Court has listed a huge number of factors in its modem jurisdictional
cases, but without ascribing any particular weight to any of the factors, preferring to
throw several of them in the pot and then magically arriving at the result." Borchers,
supranote 40, at 78. "The constitutional sufficiency test-whether it is called 'fair play
and substantial justice,' 'minimum contacts,' the 'power theory,' or something
else-functions as a balancing test." Roy L. Brooks, The Essential Purpose and
Analytical Structure ofPersonalJurisdictionLaw, 27 IND. L. REV. 361, 364 (1993). "A

balancing process can have exactlythis undesirable result-the court simplyruns through
a catalogue of competing considerations, eventually to conclude with the bare assertion
that the better view lies with one side or the other." Jay, supra note 6, at 467. "Fairness,
not sovereignty or some simple-to-apply test, remains the touchstone for evaluating the
constitutionality of assertions of jurisdiction." Moore, supra note 112, at 596. "In its
minimum contacts cases, the Court has exploited rather than remedied the inherent
vagueness of the terms fairness, justice, and reasonableness. It has never given them
specific content, often using them interchangeably and inconsistently." McMunigal,
supra note 40, at 221-22.
119. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958), states that InternationalShoe
requires a defendant not be subject to jurisdiction in a state unless he has had "minimal
contacts" with the state. The opinion places the two words into quotation marks, and
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striking, some Justices are inconsistent with themselves from opinion to opinion
or even within the same opinion. 2 '
In sum, the Supreme Court's personal jurisdiction cases in the six decades
since lnternationalShoe have done little to solidify doctrine.121 In fact, the Court

cites to a page in InternationalShoe. Needless to say, the word "minimal" or the phrase
"minimal contacts" does not appear on that page, or anywhere else in InternationalShoe.
Interestingly, defense counsel in World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 289, apparently
moved to dismiss for want of "minimal contacts," but the Court appeared to recognize
the error by placing the phrase into quotation marks in its recitation of the facts.
Probably the clearest example of opinions shifting positions is the back-and-forth
on whether state boundaries are meaningful injurisdictional analysis. See infra note 120,
Part VII.
120. Justice White writes in World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292, that due
process, through the minimum contacts test, "acts to ensure that the States through their
courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal
sovereigns in a federal system." Only two years later, in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.10 (1982), he writes, "The
restriction on state sovereign power.., however, must be seen as ultimately a function
of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause. That Clause...
makes no mention of federalism concerns."
Justice Brennan writes in dissent in HelicopterosNacionalesde Colombia, S.A. v.
Hall, 466 U.S. 408,420 (1984), that "maintenance of this suit in the Texas courts 'does
not offend [the] traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,' that are the
touchstone of jurisdictional analysis under the Due Process Clause." (alterations in
original) (citations omitted). One year later, he writes for the Court in BurgerKing, 471
U.S. at 474, "the constitutional touchstone remains whether the defendant purposefully
established 'minimum contacts' in the forum State." Within the Burger King opinion
itself, Justice Brennan writes, "The question presented is whether this exercise of longarm jurisdiction offended 'traditional conception[s] of fair play and substantial justice'
embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 464
(Brennan, J., concurring). He also writes, "The Due Process Clause protects an
individual's liberty interest in not being subject to the bindingjudgments of a forum with
which he has established no meaningful 'contacts, ties, or relations."' Id. at 471-72
(Brennan, J., concurring). For both propositions, he cites InternationalShoe.
In a similar fashion, Justice Brennan writes in concurrence in Keeton, 465 U.S. at
781 (Brennan, J., concurring), that "interests of the State should be relevant only to the
extent that they bear upon the liberty interests of the respondent that are protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment." Within a year, he writes for the Court in Burger King, 471
U.S. at 477 (Brennan, J., concurring), that courts may evaluate the forum state's interest,
the plaintiff's interest, the interstate judicial system's interest, and the shared interest of
the several states in evaluating an assertion of jurisdiction over a defendant.
"Thus, the confusion in the Supreme Court case law exists not only among the
Justices but also within the opinions of individual Justices themselves." Goldstein, supra
note 70, at 980.
121. "[P]ersonal jurisdiction doctrine has drifted aimlessly, producing an
unacceptably confused and irrational set ofjurisdictional 'rules."' Borchers, supra note
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even removed one anchor of certainty when it decided to subject the previously
predictable area of in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction to the minimum contacts
test.122 The Court has swallowed the mostly harmless but little helpful
distinction between general and specific jurisdiction.' 23 One small victory for
certainty, predictability, and ease of application was the Court's refusal to
abandon service within the boundaries of a state as a sure jurisdictional hold.2 4
Beyond that one island of certainty, all else seems to be at sea in the Court's
stream of personal jurisdiction cases.
V. THE TEST CANNOT ENDURE: DEVELOPMENT BY
OTHER COURTS
Part II of this Article attempts to trace the origins of the minimum contacts
test with little success, finding that the test was woven into whole cloth from
strands of largely unknown and untraceable origins. Part IV chronicles the
attempts of the Supreme Court over the years to develop and clarify the test.
Lower federal courts and state courts, acting in absolute good faith, have in turn
experienced great difficulty in their own attempts to understand and apply the
test. This Part explores those efforts, and the attempts of those other courts to
place glosses on the minimum contacts test in an effort to create law from
formless equity.
Lower courts have naturally expressed frustration at being required 2to
decide the same questions year after year with little additional guidance. 1
Responding to their frustration, these courts have placed various polishes on the
InternationalShoe test in an attempt to give themselves some guidance. The
courts are defining terms to define terms. Whether one calls these efforts
definitions, glosses, interpretations, expansions, clarifications, developments,
substitute tests, 6 or some other characterization, the result is the same: the
lower courts have not wished to-or more likely been able to-hold to the
unadulterated language of InternationalShoe.

40, at 105; see supra notes 112-16.

122. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
123. See Helicopteros Nacionales, 466 U.S. at 408; see infra note 186.

124. Bumham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990).
125. Perhaps the most memorable characterization is that of Judge Bruce Selya of
the First Circuit:
In the late 1930s, Winston Churchill disclaimed any ability to forecast the
Soviet Union's reaction to Nazi aggression, reputedly terming the Russian
colossus "a riddle wrapped in amystery inside an enigma." That phrase might
just as aptly describe the doctrinal vagaries of the concept of personal
jurisdiction.
Donatelli v. Nat'l Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459, 462 (1st Cir. 1990).
126. Wellington, supra note 46, at 307.
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The next Section of this Article looks at the efforts of the thirteen federal
courts of appeals to define the law of personal jurisdiction. The Section that
follows it looks at the efforts of some selected state courts to do the same.
A. FederalCourts of Appeals Cases Interpretingthe
Minimum Contacts Test
Each of the federal courts of appeals deals with the minimum contacts/fair
play test in its own fashion. This Section summarizes briefly the approach of
each of the thirteen courts. Only four circuits attempt to follow closely the
language of Supreme Court decisions. The other nine circuits, while applying
the Court's language, add substantial amounts of their own understanding to
the test.
The District of Columbia, Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits largely follow
the language of the Supreme Court's decisions, but even these four courts have
their own nuances in applying the Supreme Court's decisions. The District of
Columbia Circuit, of all the federal courts of appeals, follows most closely the
Court decisions. Indeed, in two recent personal jurisdiction decisions, the court
cites primarily to InternationalShoe itself, with a secondary citation to WorldWide Volkswagen.127 The Third Circuit generally follows the two-step test of
BurgerKing for specific jurisdiction, yet adds its own more detailed test when
a plaintiff is suing for an intentional tort committed outside the state. 2 The
Fifth Circuit takes great pains to lay out in detail what it understands to be the
test, 29 although in its essence the detailed test is merely a synthesis of Supreme
Court decisions in expanded language. The Eleventh Circuit follows the Burger

127. GTE New Media Servs. Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1347 (D.C.
Cir. 2000); United States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
128. "First, the defendant must have committed an intentional tort. Second, the
plaintiff must have felt the brunt of the harm caused by that tort in the forum, such that
the forum can be said to be the focal point of the harm suffered by the plaintiff as a result
of the tort. Third, the defendant must have expressly aimed his tortious conduct at the
forum, such that the forum can be said to be the focal point of the tortious activity." IMO
Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 256 (3d Cir. 1998).
129. "First, the nonresident defendant must have purposefully availed himself of
the benefits and protections of the forum state by establishing 'minimum contacts' with
that forum state. And second, the exercise ofjurisdiction over the nonresident defendant
must not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' The 'minimum
contacts' prong of the inquiry may be further subdivided into contacts that give rise to
'specific' personal jurisdiction and those that give rise to 'general' personal jurisdiction.
... [T]he 'fairness' of requiring a nonresident to defend a suit in a distant forum is a
function of several factors, including the 'interests of the forum State."' Wilson v. Belin,
20 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). The court then lists the five factors
in a footnote. Id. at 647 n.3.
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King two-step test with little or no gloss of its own, although it does emphasize
foreseeability by the defendant of being haled into court in the forum state. 30
The other nine courts of appeals have dealt with the InternationalShoe
minimum contacts/fair play test in widely varying fashions. The Eighth Circuit,
in a 1965 opinion written by Judge Harry Blackmun, created a five-part test that
the court uses to this day:
We also think it is fair to say that these five Supreme Court cases
establish only general and not precise guidelines. Perhaps they
purposely do no more than this. We observe, however, that, at one
time or another in the opinions, three primary factors, namely, the
quantity of the contacts, the nature and quality of the contacts, and the
source and connection of the cause of action with those contacts, are
stressed, and that two others, interest of the forum state and
convenience, receive mention. 3 '
In contrast to the heavy gloss of the Eighth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit appears
to have proceeded in the opposite direction. The court recently applied the
InternationalShoe unitary test without even mentioning later Supreme Court
developments such as BurgerKing, although it did emphasize that a defendant
forced to litigate in an inconvenient forum must have derived some benefit from
the state, and also said that whether the defendant solicited the transaction within
the proposed forum is important.'32
Three of the courts of appeals create a "sliding scale" of reasonableness to
assist in evaluating fair play. The Second Circuit first applies the two-step test
it discerns from the Supreme Court cases: "the 'minimum contacts' inquiry and
the 'reasonableness' inquiry."' 33 Then the Second Circuit employs a sliding
scale test it borrows from the First and Fourth Circuits:
[T]he reasonableness prong of the due process inquiry evokes a sliding
scale: the weaker the plaintiff's showing [on minimum contacts], the

130. Olivier v. Merritt Dredging Co., 979 F.2d 827, 830-31, 833 (1Ith Cir. 1992);
Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1516 (11th Cir. 1990).

131. Aftanase v. Econ. Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187, 197 (8th Cir. 1965). Eighteen
years later, the court said that the International Shoe test "has devolved" into
consideration of the five factors, although it added that "the last two factors are said to
be of secondary importance and not determinative." Land-O-Nod Co. v. Bassett
Furniture Indus., Inc., 708 F.2d 1339, 1340 (8th Cir. 1983) (citing Aaron Ferer & Sons
Co. v. Am. Compressed Steel Co., 564 F.2d 1206, 1210 n.5 (8th Cir. 1977)).
132. Federated Rural Elec. Ins. Corp. v. Inland Power & Light Co., 18 F.3d 389,
394 (7th Cir. 1994).
133. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 567 (2d Cir.

1996).
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less a defendant need show in terms of unreasonableness to defeat
jurisdiction. The reverse is equally true: an especially strong showing
of reasonableness may serve to fortify a borderline showing of
[minimum contacts]. "
The Fourth Circuit employs the two-part test of Burger King with the same
sliding scale as the First and Second Circuits, and also particularly emphasizes
that the defendant must have "purposefully" made contact with the
forum state.' 35
While the First Circuit also uses the sliding scale, the court more
importantly joins four other circuits in creating their own three-part test for
personal jurisdiction. The first of the five courts of appeals to use this three-part
test was the Sixth Circuit:
First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of
acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state.
Second, the cause of action must arise from the defendant's activities
there. Finally, the acts of the defendant or consequences caused by the
defendant must have a substantial enough connection with the forum
state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant
reasonable. 36

134. Id. at 569 (quoting Ticketmaster-N.Y., Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 210 (1st
Cir. 1994)); see also Ellicott Mach. Corp. v. John Holland Party Ltd., 995 F.2d 474, 479
(4th Cir. 1993).
135. Ellicott Machine, 995 F.2d at 477, recognizes that several Supreme Court
opinions require that a defendant "purposefully established 'minimum contacts"' (Asahi,

InternationalShoe), "'purposefully direct[ed]' its activities toward the residents of the
forum" (Burger King, Keeton, Hanson), and "purposefully 'availed himself of the
privilege of conducting business there"' (BurgerKing).
136. S. Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir. 1968).

Four years later, the court was dissatisfied with its earlier efforts at concreteness and
attempted to become even more specific:
The first aspect of the Southern Machine approach relating to the "purposeful
doing of an act or causing of consequence within the forum state".. . sought

to set forth in somewhat more concrete terms one essential element of the
"traditional notions of fairplay" required by InternationalShoe. An essential
element of such "fairness" in our society has always been that a person is not
asked to bear a special burden (such as defending in a foreign forum) unless
he has done something in a purposeful manner or with such knowledge as to

make his deeds the equivalent of purposeful action.... With such view of the
"purposeful action" requirement in mind, this Court in Southern Machine
elaborated on that requirement in terms of the "transacting any business"
clause of a long-arm statute. In this Circuit one has "acted" so as to transact
business in a state "when obligations created by the defendant or business
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Following this lead, the Ninth Circuit "has established a tripartite test for
determining whether due process will allow jurisdiction."''
The Tenth Circuit
both attempts to define "purposeful availment" more fully and also approves the
Ninth Circuit's three-part test for specific jurisdiction.'
The Federal Circuit
follows the BurgerKing two-part test, but subdivides the first part into whether
the defendant "purposefully" directed its activities at the forum state and whether
the claim arose from those activities. 39
' This in effect creates the same three-step
test. The First Circuit not only follows the same tripartite test but also places its
own name on the third step: it calls the five fairness criteria from BurgerKing
' 40
the "Gestalt factors."'
The above Section sketches briefly the courts of appeals' treatment of
InternationalShoe and its progeny. The purpose of sketching the personal
jurisdiction guides created or applied by each of the courts of appeals is not to
show circuit conflicts 141 or to evaluate the tests of the differing courts of appeals.

operations set in motion by the defendant have a realistic impact on the
commerce of that state." Such "acts" become purposeful if the defendant
"should have reasonably foreseen that the transaction would have
consequences in that state."
In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 226 (6th Cir. 1972)
(citations omitted).
The Sixth Circuit has also suggested that jurisdiction is more often upheld against
a nonresident seller than a nonresident buyer. Id. at 232.
137. "(A) some action must be taken whereby defendant purposefully avails
himself or herself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking
the benefits and protections of the forum's laws; (B) the claim must arise out of or result
from defendant's forum-related activities; and (C) exercise of jurisdiction must be
reasonable." Cubbage v. Merchent, 744 F.2d 665, 668 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Data
Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir. 1977).
138. Rambo v. Am. S. Ins. Co., 839 F.2d 1415, 1419-20 n.6 (10th Cir. 1988). The
court has also created considerations for personal jurisdiction specific to contract cases.
See Equifax Servs., Inc. v. Hitz, 905 F.2d 1355, 1359-60 (10th Cir. 1990).
139. Akro Corp. v. Luker, 45 F.3d 1541, 1545-46 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
140. United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d
1080, 1089 (1st Cir. 1992); Donatelli v. Nat'l Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459, 465 (1st
Cir. 1990). "Gestalt" means "a unified whole; a configuration, pattern, or organized field
having specific properties that cannot be derived from the summation of its component
parts."

WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH

LANGUAGE

594 (1996).

141. Circuit conflicts do exist. The primary example is disagreement about the test
to apply to stream of commerce cases. The Supreme Court decision in Asahi Metal
Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987), produced a badly fragmented
Court. See supra notes 103-10 and accompanying text. That fragmentation produced in
its turn sharp divisions among the courts of appeals:
The Third, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits choose to apply all three minimum
contacts analyses used in Asahi to the facts in the record without supporting
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The point is to show that the courts of appeals have not held tightly to the
decisions of the Supreme Court. Every court of appeals has, to a varying degree,
added its own language, understanding, or gloss. A reasonable inference is that
the judges of these courts felt an inherent need for greater certainty in the law
and consequently created their own more specific tests, even though their
creations could not stray too far from the Supreme Court's language.
B. State Court Cases Interpretingthe Minimum Contacts Test
The minimum contacts test has fared no better, and has probably fared
worse, in state court decisions. Although some state judges have attempted to
hold closely to the language of the Supreme Court precedents,142 far more have
placed their own understandings into the test. This Section sketches only a few
examples.
Some state courts have looked to the four-position grid suggested in
InternationalShoe as a guide to decision-making. 43 Others have made a
passive-aggressive, buyer-seller distinction: jurisdiction is more likely to be
upheld over a nonresident who aggressively enters the state as a seller to a local
buyer, than over a nonresident who is a passive buyer from an aggressive
resident seller.'" Still others have attempted to stay within the boundaries of the
Supreme Court decisions, but have required page after page of discussion to
determine what they interpret those boundaries to be.1 45 Some state courts have

one analysis over the other. The Fourth and Tenth Circuits reconciled the
decisions in World- Wide Volkswagen and Asahi in order to apply one test.
The First Circuit is the only circuit to conclusively adopt the position of

Justice O'Connor in applying the stream of commerce analysis in product
liability suits. Because Asahi did not command a majority of the Court on the
amount of contact required under stream of commerce, three of the circuits
still apply the standard in World-Wide Volkswagen.

Kristin R. Baker, Product Liability Suits and the Stream of Commerce After Asahi:
World-Wide Volkswagen Is Still the Answer, 35 TULSA L.J. 705, 712 (2000) (footnotes
omitted).
142. See, e.g., Ga. Insurers Insolvency Pool v. Brewer, 602 So. 2d 1264 (Fla.

1992); LaMarca v. Pak-Mor Mfg. Co., 735 N.E.2d 883 (N.Y. 2000).
143. The four-position grid of InternationalShoe is explained supranote 80. State
court decisions applying the grid are collected in John T. McDermott, Personal
Jurisdiction: The Hidden Agendas in the Supreme Court Decisions, 10 VT. L. REV. 1,
39-40 (1985); Stravitz, supra note 116, at 734 n.32.
144. E.g., Cascade Lumber Co. v. Edward Rose Bldg. Co., 596 N.W.2d 90, 92

(Iowa 1999); Dent-Air, Inc. v. Beech Mountain Air Serv., Inc., 332 N.W.2d 904,907-08
(Minn. 1983); Higgins v. Rausch Herefords, 609 N.W.2d 712, 719-20 (Neb. Ct. App.
2000); Barile v. Univ. of Va., 441 N.E.2d 608, 614 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981).
145. For example, Vons Cos. v. Seabest Foods,Inc., 926 P.2d 1085, 1091-94 (Cal.
1996), requires nearly five pages of text to summarize the current state of the law from
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openly announced their own "tests" for personal jurisdiction. Examples are
Washington and Texas. Under the subheading "THE TEXAS TEST," the Texas
Supreme Court announced the following test for specific jurisdiction cases:
(1) The nonresident defendant or foreign corporation must
purposefully do some act or consummate some transaction in the
forum state;
(2) The cause of action must arise from, or be connected with, such act
or transaction; and
(3) The assumption ofjurisdiction by the forum state must not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, consideration
being given to the quality, nature, and extent of the activity in the
forum state, the relative convenience of the parties, the benefits and
protection of the laws of the forum state afforded the respective
46
parties, and the basic equities of the situation. 1
The same opinion goes even further for general jurisdiction cases by expanding
the second of the three parts to read as follows:
(2) The cause of action must arise from, or be connected with, such act
or transaction. Even if the cause of action does not arise from a
specific contact, jurisdiction may be exercised if the defendant's
47
contacts with Texas are continuing and systematic.
In sum, as with the federal courts of appeals, most state courts have not
been satisfied merely to apply the Supreme Court's language, but instead have
placed their own imprints on the due process test. One popular treatise
synthesizes both federal and state cases as follows:
Today, courts typically employ a three-step test to determine the
constitutionality of asserting specific personal jurisdiction. First, did
the defendant purposefully avail itself of the forum state? Second, did
the cause of action arise from the defendant's contacts with the forum

Supreme Court cases.
146. Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355, 358 (Tex. 1990). The Texas test
traces back to O'Brien v. Lanpar Co., 399 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex. 1966).
147. Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 358. Texas mayhave borrowed from Washington,
or Washington may have borrowed from Texas, or one may have borrowed from another
court. No matter what the time line, Washington's test is nearly identical to the Texas
test. See Grange Ins. Ass'n v. State, 757 P.2d 933, 937 (Wash. 1988). The Washington
test traces back to Tyee Construction Co. v. Dulien Steel Products, Inc., 381 P.2d 245,

251 (Wash. 1963).
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Finally, would the exercise of personal jurisdiction be

reasonable?148
The authors of the treatise do not reveal which court decisions they are
synthesizing, but they are synthesizing decisions of courts other than the

Supreme Court.
The freedom of the state courts to go their own way has become more
boundless both as state legislatures enact long-arm statutes that expressly reach
to the limits of due process, and as state courts interpret enumerated acts longarm statutes to reach to the limits of due process. More than three-fifths of the
states now have statutes that either expressly provide or are interpreted to reach
to the limits of due process.' 49 What was formerly a two-step test, consisting of
statutory interpretation of a long-arm statute, followed by the minimum
contacts/fair play test, has in a majority of states become a one-step test. The
statutory anchor has been removed and the entire decision is placed on the

148. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ETAL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.11, at 140 (3d ed. 1999).

This synthesized test is quite like the tests employed by the First, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and
Federal Circuits, and states including Texas and Washington. See supra notes 136-40,
146-47.
149. Classification of states into these categories is difficult because some states
have not made their interpretation clear, several states have flip-flopped back and forth
between interpretations, and several states have added catch-all no limits clauses to their
enumerated acts long-arm statutes. For that reason, different commentators have created
differing lists of where the states stand. See, e.g., 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, §
1068, at 577-81 (identifying twenty-eight states that have enacted long-arm statutes or
court rules that reach to the limits of due process, either by their own terms or by court
interpretation); see also David S. Welkowitz, Goingto the Limits ofDue Process: Myth,
Mystery and Meaning, 28 DUQ. L. REV. 233, 237 (1990). In research for an article
currentlyin preparation, I conducted a fifty-state study of long-arm statutes. The findings
are that only eighteen states today have an enumerated acts long-arm statute that the state
courts interpret as a prerequisite to a finding of long-arm jurisdiction (Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, West
Virginia, Wisconsin). The other thirty-two states, in one way or another, stretch their
long-arm jurisdiction to the limits of due process. Eleven states have comprehensive
long-arm statutes that by their own terms are limited only by due process (Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Iowa, Nevada, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Vermont, Wyoming). Nine states have enumerated acts long-arm statutes that have
added a no limits catch-all clause (Alabama, Alaska, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Nebraska,
Oregon, South Dakota, Tennesee). The remaining twelve states have enumerated acts
long-arm statutes that, despite the limited language of the statute, the state courts have
interpreted to reach the limits of due process (Colorado, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
Washington). Douglas D. McFarland, Dictum Run Wild: How Long-Arm Statutes
Extended to the Limits of Due Process (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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court's "notions of fair play." This development obviously makes even more
acute the problem of judges deciding jurisdiction cases on their personal
predilections of fairness.'
In turn, it provides additional support for the
argument that a new, more certain and predictable standard for personal
jurisdiction is needed.
VI. DROP THE SHOE
This Article has already documented problems with the InternationalShoe
minimum contacts/fair play test. These problems include the test's rootlessness
and inherent flaccidity, as well as the confusion, unpredictability, high
transaction costs, and inconsistent results it produces because it places unfettered
power into the pens of individual judges to decide what strikes them as "fair."
The irony of InternationalShoe is that the Court's creation of the minimum
contacts/fair play test was intended to and did expand the personal jurisdiction
reach of the states. Yet today no one thinks of minimum contacts as supporting
the assertion of state authority; rather, one thinks of minimum contacts as an
outer limit of state authority. In a large sense, the test has been turned inside out.
While everyone realizes the Supreme Court is reluctant to cast aside even
one of its decisions, let alone a whole area of law, in favor of beginning anew,
sometimes that is exactly what is needed. After all, the Court did so when it
abandoned Pennoyerin favor of InternationalShoe.' 5' That new test has had its
six decades of usefulness. No one seems to be happy or satisfied with it, not the
54
53
52
lower federal courts,' the state courts, or the commentators.
Courts and commentators are searching for law, not a doctrine that produces
close cases with no overriding philosophy to decide them. 55 People want law,

150. See supra text accompanying notes 64-70.
151. "To abandon a theoretical construct is to unsettle habits of mind, to deplete
stores of knowledge, and perhaps to invite unforeseeable difficulties. A system of legal
concepts, however inelegant, can easily persist beyond the point when it produces or
invites bad results-these can be avoided by decisional manipulation. But when a
conceptual system has become so involved that understanding it is more difficult than
deciding how to apply it to particular cases, searching for new concepts is as attractive
as attempting to retain the old." Hazard, supra note 6, at 243. In 1965 Professor Hazard
was writing of the need to abandon Pennoyer. This Article proposes that International
Shoe has reached the same stage of life.
152. See supra Part V.A.
153. See supra Part V.B.
154. See, e.g., Cameron & Johnson, supra note 8, at 771-74 nn.5-13; Heiser, supra
note 6, at 915; Weinberg, supra note 116, at 102 ("Clearly, it is time to jettison minimum
contacts. InternationalShoe is bankrupt.").
155. See Heiser, supra note 6, at 958.
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not an advisory guide to fact-finding. The Supreme Court should drop the Shoe.
This Article proposes a law of personal jurisdiction.

VII. SHOULD A TEST CONSIDER STATE BOUNDARIES?
Before proposing a new law of personal jurisdiction, this Article discusses
whether a test for personal jurisdiction should take into account state boundaries.
In other words, do state boundaries have continuing legal significance for the
jurisdictional reach of state courts? Or have state boundaries become largely
irrelevant as the law moves toward a convenience test for personal jurisdiction?
For want of a better term, this has become known as the "federalism debate" in
personal jurisdiction.' 56 This Part attempts to give a pragmatic and objective
answer, not a philosophical or normative answer,' to the question of whether
state borders matter in personal jurisdiction.
The debate over the years has permeated the opinions of the Supreme Court.
This is so because the Court fastened on the Due Process Clause as its source of
authority to oversee state court assertions of jurisdiction.'58 The Clause itself
appears to protect individual rights: "nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .. . .""9 It makes no

mention of state sovereignty, so placing state power interests into an analysis

156. E.g., Borchers, supra note 40, at 78; McMunigal, supra note 40, at 212. To
call the personal jurisdiction debate over state boundaries a "federalism" debate seems
inappropriate. Granted, the question is one of Supreme Court control through the Due
Process Clause over the jurisdictional power of state courts. That seems to be a
federalism question. Yet the true debate is not federal versus state, but rather is state
versus state. Under what circumstances can a state court reach out beyond its boundaries
to summon a defendant from another state without violating the sovereignty of the other
state? That was the question to which Pennoyer gave a too-rigid answer, and
InternationalShoe gave a too-flexible answer. Consequently, this debate might well be

better titled a "sovereignty" debate, or even perhaps a "states' rights" debate. Even so,
because the debate is commonly referred to as one of federalism, that is the term used

here.
157. Some articles arguing that federalism concerns are, or are not, appropriate for
jurisdictional decisions are collected infra notes 164-65. One example of a normative
approach is Kurland, supra note 57, at 569: "[D]octrines of federalism have been
subordinated by the Supreme Court to concepts of convenience. The result is another
major step-in this instance, perhaps a desirable one-toward the limitation of the
federal principle."
158. Even though the holding in Pennoyerwas grounded in international law and
public law principles, the opinion identified the Due Process Clause, U.S. CONST.amend.
XIV, § 1, as the source of the Court's future power to supervise state court jurisdiction.
InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington,326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945), agreed. Other sources
of authority in the Constitution could have been used. See supra note 12.
159. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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based on due process is analytically difficult. 60 Yet the analytical foundation of
Pennoyer,the first major Supreme Court decision on state jurisdictional reach,
was state sovereignty, and InternationalShoe required minimum contacts with
the state to make jurisdiction by a state over a defendant fair and just; it was not
about convenience without boundaries.
No wonder that opinions since International Shoe have exhibited
ambivalence and outright disagreement on whether federalism concerns should
play a part in jurisdictional analysis. In the opinions, concerns for federalism
have flowed and ebbed. 6 ' In some opinions, federalism concerns have been
paramount.' 62 In other opinions, the Court has seemingly dismissed federalism
and state borders in favor of a convenience analysis.' 63 The debate continues

160. See McMunigal, supra note 40, at 212.
161. Borchers, supra note 40, at 78; McMunigal, supra note 40, at 211-12.
162. Certainly the first rise of federalism in Supreme Court decisions after
InternationalShoe was Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), in which the Court
stated, "[I]t is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual demise of all
restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts. Those restrictions are more than
a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence
of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States." Id. at 251 (citations
omitted). The Court's concern for federalism was expressed even more forcefully in
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-93 (1980):
The concept of minimum contacts, in turn, can be seen to perform two related,
but distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant against the burdens
of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the
States through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on
them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.... [W]e have
never accepted the proposition that state lines are irrelevant for jurisdictional
purposes, nor could we, and remain faithful to the principles of interstate
federalism embodied in the Constitution.... The sovereignty of each State,
in turn, implied a limitation on the sovereignty of all of its sister States-a
limitation express or implicit in both the original scheme of the Constitution
and the Fourteenth Amendment.
163. Only two years after authoring World-Wide Volkswagen, Justice White
authored InsuranceCorp. ofIrelandv.Compagniedes Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694
(1982), in which the Court seemed to dismiss federalism concerns from jurisdictional
analysis in a footnote:
The restriction on state sovereign power ... must be seen as ultimately a
function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process
Clause. That Clause is the only source of the personal jurisdiction
requirement and the Clause itself makes no mention of federalism concerns.
Furthermore, if the federalism concept operated as an independent restriction
on the sovereign power of the court, it would not be possible to waive the
personal jurisdiction requirement: Individual actions cannot change the
powers of sovereignty, although the individual can subject himself to powers
from which he may otherwise be protected.
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today. Commentators make arguments both for 164 and against' 65 federalism/state
boundaries as a proper consideration in jurisdictional decisions.
Before this Article can propose a new test for personal jurisdiction, it must
face the question squarely: do state boundaries matter for jurisdictional
purposes? The answer is yes. State boundaries matter. They cannot
conveniently be ignored.
The Supreme Court opinions grounded in state sovereignty concerns cannot
be brushed aside. All would agree that Pennoyerv. Neff, 66 the first major Court
opinion on personal jurisdiction, was based on concerns for state sovereignty.
Judges of that era agreed, "The foundation of personal jurisdiction is physical
power.' 67 While InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington 68 largely replaced the
Pennoyer regime, it did not ignore state boundaries, requiring that a corporate
defendant have "minimum contacts" within the forum state "such that"
jurisdiction by that state would not offend "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice." Much of the opinion's language refers to activities within
a state, retaining importance for state borders. 69 Later opinions expressly
ground the minimum contacts test in "federalism" concerns.' 0 The two most

Id. at 703 n.10.
Again in a footnote, in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n. 13

(1985) (quoting Bauxites, 456 U.S. at 703 n.10), the Court reaffirmed the rejection of
federalism concerns: "Although this protection operates to restrict state power, it 'must
be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due
Process Clause' rather than as a function 'of federalism concerns."'
164. See, e.g., BRILMAYER,supra note 116, at 39-40; Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts
Count: DueProcessLimitations on State CourtJurisdiction,1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 85;
Cebik, supra note 12, at 16; Goldstein, supra note 70, at 974; Hazard, supranote 6, at
246-47; Terry S. Kogan, A Neo-Federalist Tale of PersonalJurisdiction,63 S.CAL. L.

REV. 257, 257 (1990); Sheehan, supra note 112, at 439; Allan R. Stein, Styles of
Argument and InterstateFederalismin the Law ofPersonalJurisdiction,65 TEX. L. REV.

689, 690 (1987).
165. See, e.g., Kevin Clermont, Restating TerritorialJurisdictionand Venue for
State and FederalCourts, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 411,451-55 (1981); Perdue, supra note
116, at 514; Martin H. Redish, Due Process,Federalism,and PersonalJurisdiction: A
Theoretical Evolution, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 1112 (1981); Redish & Beste, supra note 46,
at 939-40; Russell J. Weintraub, Due ProcessLimitations on the PersonalJurisdiction
of State Courts: Time for Change, 63 OR. L. REV. 485, 527 (1984); Weintraub, supra
note 113, at 548-49.

166. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
167. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
168. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).

169. Cf Robert C. Casad, Shaffer v. Heitner: An End to Ambivalence in
Jurisdiction Theory?, 26 U. KAN. L. REV. 61, 65 (1977).
170. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980);
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958); see supra note 162.
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recent Supreme Court decisions on personal jurisdiction, while not discussing
federalism and state sovereignty directly, are clearly based on the assumption
that state borders matter.' 7' State authority and power over the individual
defendant appear consistently to mean something to the Court.
The argument that state boundaries are irrelevant posits the Due Process
Clause as a protector of individual liberties. Because an objection to personal
jurisdiction can be waived, the argument continues, state jurisdictional reach
cannot be based on state sovereignty, for an individual would not be able to
waive a state's sovereignty. So states a famous footnote. 72
Although Justice White, the author of the footnote, thought that the
possibility of waiver by a party must negate any sovereignty basis for personal
jurisdiction, his thinking was mistaken. First, the Court has based many of its
personal jurisdiction decisions over the years, both before and after writing the
footnote, on sovereignty concerns."' Second, other areas of the law-as well as
comparative systems of personal jurisdiction-are rooted in interests beyond that
of the individual, yet the individual can waive objection.7 ' Third, if in fact
personal jurisdiction based on due process were grounded solely in individual
liberty, one would expect a court to look solely to the interests of the defendant
in making its decision on fair play, yet a court is instructed to consider also the
interests of the plaintiff, the forum state, the interstate judicial system, and the
several states.'75 Those concerns far transcend the defendant's individual liberty
interests. Finally, the answer to the "waivable" sovereignty conundrum is one
that has existed for well more than a century. Pennoyer's analysis is based on
recognition and protection of state sovereignty, yet the opinion recognizes pre-

171. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 625 (1990) (holding that service
within the borders of a state is effective to establish personal jurisdiction); Asahi Metal
Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (holding that placing a product

into the stream of commerce is insufficient for jurisdiction absent purposeful direction
toward the forum state).
172. Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,702

n.10 (1982); see supra note 163.
173. See supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text. These decisions cannot be
regarded as mere aberrations. Drobak, supra note 27, at 1047.
174. Professor Stephen Goldstein points out (1) that doctrines of res judicata and

statutes of limitation in part protect interests of the judicial system, and (2) that the
personal jurisdiction doctrines of the Brussels Convention, England, and Israel protect

sovereignty interests, yet all can be waived by individual action of the defendant.
Goldstein, supra note 70, at 974-75. In that sense, the Due Process Clause can be
considered as requiring an inquiry into the ability of a state to impose jurisdiction on a
defendant instead of the liberty of the defendant to be free from jurisdiction. Brilmayer,
supra note 164, at 85.
175. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,476-77 (1985). Interestingly,

these additional considerations were foreshadowed in World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S.
at 292, an opinion that clearly emphasized federalism concerns.
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existing law that provides alternatives to service within a state's borders:
domicile and consent. 76 In other words, a defendant has always been able to
consent to personal jurisdiction in a state, even at a time when the law of
personal jurisdiction was based entirely on state sovereignty. Waiver is a form
of consent. The ability to waive a personal jurisdiction defense no more
undercuts a state sovereignty analytical base for personal jurisdiction than does
the ability to consent to that same jurisdiction.
Accordingly, this Article answers the question of whether state boundaries
matter in jurisdictional analysis with a clear "yes." The United States is
composed of fifty states, each with a measure of sovereignty. Accordingly, any
proposal for a new law of personal jurisdiction must take that fact into account.
The next Part of the Article makes such a proposal.
VIII. A LAW OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
The fairness test of International Shoe, even as it has become the
fairness/convenience test of today, has failed. It has failed because it is not law.
This Part proposes a law of personal jurisdiction.
Three primary threads comprise the new law. The first two of these threads
are consistent with and synthesize Supreme Court cases over the years. The first
thread is that state boundaries are meaningful. 77 This rules out a test based on
convenience-similar to forum non conveniens-in which state boundaries are
irrelevant. 78 The second of these two threads requires a defendant voluntarily
to bring itself within a state's sphere of authority. The Court has often called this
"purposeful availment.' 1 79 The "purposeful availment" thread in the Court's

176. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877). Consent to personal jurisdiction
has long been recognized in the common law. See SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE
EXPANsION OF THE COMMON LAW 145 (1904). One can even argue that the base of a
personal jurisdiction doctrine of fairness is consent. Cappalli, supra note 46, at 106.
177. See supra Part VII.
178. Some have proposed a pure convenience test. See infra note 206.
179. The requirement of "purposeful availment" was introduced in Hanson v.
is essential in each case that there be some act
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958): "[I]t
by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." The
purposeful availment requirement has been powerful in several other Court decisions
over the years. E.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987);
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474-75 ("purposefully established 'minimum contacts' in the
forum State"); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)
("purposefully directed"); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297; Kulko v. Superior
Court, 436 U.S. 84, 94 (1978). "[J]urisdiction is acquired when defendants bring
themselves within the range of a state's power. Like magnetism, jurisdiction is a force
field surrounding the forum .. " Jay, supra note 6, at 474.
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decisions does not require the expectation of economic gain, although that
appears to be implicit in many of the opinions.' 80
The third thread of the proposed new law of personal jurisdiction rejects the
"fair play" flexibility of InternationalShoe and its progeny in favor of a brightline test. A bright-line test provides foreseeability and predictability of results
and thus eliminates large, unnecessary initial transaction costs in litigation over
the threshold issue of personal jurisdiction. 8' In other areas of the law, such as

Several of the Court's opinions have also mentioned a requirement that a defendant
must be able to foresee "being haled into court" in the forum state. E.g., World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. This idea adds nothing to the "purposeful availment" idea.
Rather, it is merely an extension of the same thought. When a defendant purposefully
avails itself of entry into the forum state, it will be able to foresee being haled into court
there. See supra text accompanying notes 92-93.
180. The clearest submission occurs when a person intentionally enters a state's
sphere of authority to gain economic advantage. In some opinions, the expectation of
economic benefit is explicit in the holding that the defendant intentionally entered the
sphere of the state's authority. E.g., Keeton, 465 U.S. at 781 ("Where [defendant] has
continuously and deliberately exploited the New Hampshire market, it must reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there .... ."); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297
("Hence if the sale of a product .. .arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or
distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the market.., it is not unreasonable to subject
it to suit in one of those States ....).Even before the creation of the "purposeful
availment" theme in Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253, the Court inMcGee v. InternationalLife
InsuranceCo., 355 U.S. 220,223 (1957), upheldjurisdiction over an insurance company
that had a single active policy in the forum state in large part because "modem
transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome"--and thus more
fair-to defend "in a State where [the defendant] engages in economic activity." Cf
Martin B. Louis, The Grasp of Long Arm JurisdictionFinally Exceeds Its Reach: A
Comment on World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v. Savchuk, 58 N.C.
L. REV. 407, 426-28 (1980).
181. The transaction costs of the current minimum contacts/fair play test are high.
See supra note 113. These costs are both unacceptably high and unnecessary "for issues
which need to be determined quickly and efficiently at the outset of litigation."
Silberman, supra note 102, at 582. Yet challenge to jurisdiction is almost mandatory
under the current case-by-case balancing test in which the outcome is largely
unpredictable. The result is large expenditures ofjudicial resources at the trial level and
inability of appellate courts to perform their function of applying the law. When
foreseeability in a test is achieved, these transaction costs largely disappear. "This
foreseeability can best be insured, not by case-by-case, particularized, after-the-fact
balancing tests, but by clear, uniform limits." Sheehan, supra note 112, at 438.
One can state the need no better than did the American Law Institute, when it wrote
about subject matter jurisdiction: "It is of first importance to have a definition so clear
cut that it will not invite extensive threshold litigation over jurisdiction [even though]
differentiations of treatment... appear somewhat arbitrary." AMERICAN LAwINSTrrUTE,
STUDY OF THE DIvISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 128

(1969).

One commentator summed this up well:

"Jurisdiction should be as self-
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subject matter jurisdiction and preclusion, the Supreme Court has valued the
need for certainty over the need for achieving "pure" justice in each individual
case."8 2 What is true for the lesser-litigated issue of subject matter jurisdiction
and the seldom-litigated issue of res judicata should also be true for the oftenlitigated issue of personal jurisdiction. The policies of efficiency, certainty,
foreseeability, stability, and uniform treatment are no less applicable. A
challenge to personal jurisdiction should be determined surely and quickly.
Therefore, the proposed new test for personal jurisdiction is clear and
understandable law.
The proposed new law of personal jurisdiction deals only with long-arm
jurisdiction-the area of the law laid down in InternationalShoe. It does not
change current law of jurisdiction over nonconsenting persons domiciled or
served within the state.
With those considerations in mind, I propose a new law of personal
jurisdiction. A state hasjurisdictionover a personfor any claim arisingout of
thatperson 's intentionaltransactionalentry into the state. This might be called
the intentional transactional entry test.
This law is both broader and narrower than InternationalShoe and its
progeny. A brief discussion of the elements making up the proposed law will aid
understanding.
First, jurisdiction exists only for an intentional transactional entry. The
defendant must know, or be substantially certain, that its actions will pierce the
borders of the forum state.8 3 Unintentional entry does not suffice for
jurisdiction."8 While "intentional" seems best to capture the required state of

regulated as breathing; . . . litigation over whether the case is in the right court is
essentially a waste of time and resources." David P. Currie, The FederalCourtsand the

American Law Institute, Part!, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 1(1968).
182. With regard to subject matter jurisdiction, the Court said in NavarroSaving
Ass 'n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 464 n.13 (1980), "The relative simplicity of the established
principle is one of its virtues," and added quotations from the American Law Institute and
David P. Currie. See supranote 181. On another occasion, the Court said, "[P]rompt,
economical and sound administration ofjustice depends to a large degree upon definite
and finally accepted principles governing important areas of litigation, such as the
respective jurisdictions of federal and state courts.. . ." Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn,
341 U.S. 6, 8 (1951). With regard to preclusion, the Court said in FederatedDepartment
Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981), "The doctrine of res judicata serves vital
public interests beyond any individual judge's ad hoc determination of the equities in a
particular case."
183. This definition is borrowed from RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A
(1965). Intent is used "to denote that the actor desires to cause consequences of his act,
or that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it."
184. Cf Developments in the Law, supranote 8, at 939 ("When the defendant's
presence is a result of compulsion or fraud, or when he could not have foreseen or
prevented his entry into the state, his presence should be irrelevant in determining
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mind producing the entry, alternative formulations might be possible; some come
from Supreme Court cases.' 85
Second, jurisdiction exists only for intentional transactionalentry. The
claim must arise out of the defendant's entry into the state. This means all
assertions of personal jurisdiction are specific; the concept of general jurisdiction
is abolished.' 86 Here the new law is narrower than current law. This might raise

whether jurisdiction exists.").
185. Of course, the Court has often used the terms "purposeful availment" or
"purposeful direction." It has also used other synonymous phrases. In Keeton, 465 U.S.
at 781, the Court wrote, "[The defendant] has continuously and deliberately exploited the
[state] market .... In Calderv. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984), the Court wrote
that the "actions were expressly aimed at California," and the defendants were "primary
participants in an alleged wrongdoing intentionally directed at a California resident."
Like phrases come from commentators. "[D]efendant has a 'deliberate impact' in the
forum .....
" Brilmayer, supra note 164, at 91. "[I]f the defendant has been involved in
the distribution of goods to the forum state, his contacts with it are volitional and
financially beneficial." Louis, supra note 180, at 426.
One commentator has asserted that a court cannot ascribe cognitive intent to a
corporation, Woods, supranote 101, at 885, but the response is that intent can be inferred
from actions and knowledge. A manufacturer does not intentionally direct the
automobile in question into a state by placing it into the stream of commerce, yet the
manufacturer is "substantially certain" a percentage of its products will enter the state.
That is intentional entry.
186. General jurisdiction is thought to exist over a defendant that is engaged in
systematic and continuous activity within a state, even though the claim giving rise to the
lawsuit does not arise from the in-state activity. This possibility was first recognized in
InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,318 (1945), and christened "general
jurisdiction" in ArthurT. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdictionto Adjudicate:
A SuggestedAnalysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1966). The Supreme Court accepted the
terminology in HelicopterosNacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414
(1984).
The serious question is not what to call this jurisdictional phenomenon. The serious
question is whether it has a reason to exist. Specific jurisdiction will always exist in at
least one forum, and almost always in at least one forum convenient to the plaintiff.
General jurisdiction based on continuous activity of a defendant in a forum otherwise
unrelated to the claim accomplishes no more than to invite the plaintiff to forum-shop.
Even the commentators who coined the term believed that as specific jurisdiction
expanded, the need for general jurisdiction would diminish, perhaps to the vanishing
point, because it is unfair to defendants. von Mehren & Trautman, supra, at 1177-79.
Others have argued that general jurisdiction should be eliminated. See Harold G. Maier
& Thomas R. McCoy, A Unifying Theory for JudicialJurisdictionand Choice of Law,
39 AM. J. COMP. L. 249, 271-80 (1991); Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General
Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 629 (1988); cf Cebik, supra note 12, at 21-22;
Heiser, supranote 6, at 924-25; P. John Kozyris, Reflections on Allstate-The Lessening
of Due Process in Choice of Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 889, 894 (1981); Donald J.
Werner, Dropping the Other Shoe: Shaffer v. Heitner and the Demise of Presence-
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objections, as some forum choices are taken from plaintiffs. Yet the loss is not
large, as few general jurisdiction cases are brought today.'87 And plaintiffs retain
forum choices."'8 More importantly, loss of a few opportunities to forum-shop
is a small price for plaintiffs to pay for the many benefits a sure-footed new law
of personal jurisdiction will bring.
Third and finally, jurisdiction exists for intentional transactional entry. The
defendant must enter the state. Intentional entry supplies any submission to the
authority of the state thought necessary. 9 Here the new law is broader than
current law. When a defendant's intentional entry into a state gives rise to a
claim, the state has personal jurisdiction over the defendant with no ifs, ands, or
buts. This is true whether or not the defendant has any additional ties with the
state. A single act that gives rise to a claim will always provide jurisdiction. The
court will not consider "fair play and substantial justice," reasonableness,
"convenience factors," or anything of the sort. Defendants will lose the
opportunity to escape the forum based on fairness. Yet the loss is not large, as,
few defendants are likely to succeed in a challenge to jurisdiction when the claim
arises from the entry. 9 ° More importantly, removal of a few opportunities to
escape an "inconvenient forum" is a small price for defendants to pay for the
many benefits a sure-footed new law of personal jurisdiction will bring.
Any real concerns about fairness in the individual case are better addressed
by other doctrines, primarily forum non conveniens.'9' Choice of law is
another.' 92 In the federal system, ventte can be transferred, 93 or the court might

OrientedJurisdiction,45 BROOK. L. REv. 565, 591 (1979).
187. Twitchell, supra note 186, at 630. Only one of the nineteen personal
jurisdiction cases the Supreme Court has decided since InternationalShoe was a general
jurisdiction case. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); see
McDermott, supra note 143, at 47-48.
188. In addition to any forum where a defendant might consent, the plaintiff has
other options. Another variant of "general" jurisdiction will always exist over a natural
person in any state where he or she is served, and over a corporation in its state of
incorporation. Additionally, one transaction may well enter multiple states. For example,
in a case of injury from a product placed into the stream of commerce, the plaintiff could
sue in any state in the distribution chain that the defendant knew the product would enter.
189. See supra Part VII.
190. Even InternationalShoe recognized that when a claim arises from a single act
in the forum, jurisdiction is possible. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318.
191. Cameron & Johnson, supra note 8, at 843; Stravitz, supra note 116, at 811.
European systems provide precision in their jurisdiction laws, with any unfairness
alleviated by a doctrine similar to forum non conveniens. See Silberman, supra note 43,
at 762-63.
192. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1985), mentions
choice of law and transfer of venue as methods to reduce inconvenience.
193. The interests for the court to consider in a transfer of venue are "the
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interests of justice." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol68/iss4/1

46

McFarland: McFarland: Drop the Shoe:
2003]

A LAW OFPERSONAL JURISDICTION

even abstain.' 94 The realistic fact is that a defendant's fairness concerns are few
or none. The real issue is choice of forum, i.e., forum-shopping by a
defendant. 95
'
Some applications of the new law of personal jurisdiction will be
considered in the next Part of this Article. Before turning to these applications,
however, I respond here to two objections to this new law that will likely
be raised.
First, as a bright-line test, the intentional transactional entry test will run
afoul of judges and commentators who assert generally that any bright-line test
is simplistic and an effort to hold back the moving sands of legal realism, and
assert specifically that such a test will not work for personal jurisdiction. In
InternationalShoe itself, Chief Justice Stone wrote, "It is evident that the criteria
by which we mark the boundary line between those activities which justify the
subjection of a corporation to suit, and those which do not, cannot be simply
mechanical or quantitative."' 96 Ofcourse, this was a bald assertion, transparently
meant to protect the test that Chief Justice Stone had just created. The assertion
brings with it no authority or reasoning to answer the question of whether a test
in the area should be a bright-line test or should be akin to the InternationalShoe
balancing test. Even though some later Court opinions parrot Chief Justice
Stone's admonition, they add no reasoning to support it.197

(2002). In the federal system, venue is unlikely to be properly laid in a district that is
truly inconvenient for the defendant. This is so because the two primary venues are (1)
a district in a state in which all defendants reside, or (2) a district in which "a substantial
part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of
property that is the subject of the action is situated." Id. § 1391(a), (b). Certainly neither
of these venues should be inconvenient for the defendants. The third possibility for
venue is a district in which "any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction" in diversity
cases or in which "any defendant maybe found" in federal question and other cases. Id.
While a district chosen under this third option may sometimes be inconvenient, the third
option can be used only when neither of the first two options is available.
194. See generally CHARLES A. WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS § 52 (6th ed. 2002).
195. See Lea Brilmayer et al., A GeneralLook at GeneralJurisdiction,66 TEX. L.
REv. 721, 775-79 (1988); Stanley E. Cox, The Interested Forum, 48 MERCER L. REv.
727, 742-48 (1997); Heiser, supra note 6, at 936-38; Maier & McCoy, supra note 186,
at 253-56; Wendy Collins Perdue, PersonalJurisdictionand the Beetle in the Box, 32
B.C. L. REv. 529, 560-73 (1991).
196. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
197. E.g., BurgerKing, 471 U.S. at 478; Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92
(1978). While Chief Justice Stone was apparently protecting his new creation, one may
question whether repetition in these later opinions is intended more to protect the test or
more to protect the power of judges to reach whatever result they think fair in the

individual case.
Other arguments opposing a bright-line test are equally groundless.
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Granted, many areas of the law must be drawn in shades of grey.198
Personal jurisdiction need not be. The judicial system will be far better served
by a test that promotes the policies of predictability, stability, certainty,
uniformity, and efficiency of result than by a test that virtually guarantees
litigation in every case to the end of producing a result that an individual judge
thinks "fair." The Supreme Court gladly advances bright-line rules in reliance
on these policies in analogous areas of the law such as subject matterjurisdiction
and res judicata. 99 The same attitude should prevail even more for the threshold
issue of personal jurisdiction.
Second, this Article proposes that the Supreme Court scrap nearly sixty
years of precedent in favor of a new law of personal jurisdiction. That is
unlikely. Yet that is what the Court did in InternationalShoe when it realized
the prior law of Pennoyerwas no longer serviceable. 00 The wheel has turned
round again.
From another perspective, the proposed law should be palatable to the Court
because in many ways it is not truly starting afresh. The intentional transactional
entry test is crafted in large part from Court precedents. The test can in part be
seen as a restatement of the Court's requirement that a defendant must
"purposefully avail" itself of the benefits and protections of the laws of the forum
state.2 ' It could even be seen as a restatement of minimum contacts with "fair

Chemerinsky, supra note 111, at 866, 868:
[U]ncertainty in the law of personal jurisdiction is inevitable and desirable.
Ultimately, the minimum contacts test is about fairness; when is it unfair to
hale an out-of-state defendant to another state? No bright-line test for this can
ever be created .... Minimum contacts, although inherently vague, is a
desirable test because it properly focuses courts on what should be at the core
of personal jurisdiction analysis: does the person have sufficient connections
to the state as to make it fair to hale her into the state?
The argument begs the question. It starts with the point of view that a personal
jurisdiction test should be about fairness, identifies the minimum contacts test as one of
fairness, and concludes therefore that the test is good. Conversely, a bright-line test,
which is not one of fairness, would be bad. Where is the support for the initial
proposition that a personal jurisdiction test should be about fairness?
198. The Supreme Court wrote in beautiful prose in Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541,
545 (1947), "[T]here are few areas of the law in black and white. The greys are dominant
and even among them the shades are innumerable. For the eternal problem of the law is
one of making accommodations between conflicting interests. This is why most legal
problems end as questions of degree." Having written this ode to complex thought, the
Court reversed itself in the next paragraph: "The Full Faith and Credit Clause is not to
be applied, accordion-like, to accommodate our personal predilections." Id. at 545.
199. See supra note 182.
200. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
201. This concern was first recognized in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253
(1958), and has appeared in many of the Court decisions over the years, including the
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play and substantial justice" shorn away; certainly the test eliminates any
"convenience factors" identified in the progeny of InternationalShoe.2 °2 The
test is, however, even stronger than a bare minimum contacts test. It is a
minimum contact test. A single intentional entry into a state will always result
in a finding of jurisdiction over that transaction. The proposed law is actually
similar to the three-step test used today by many lower federal courts and state
courts2 3-again with the third part, the reasonableness step, deleted. The fact
that the "new" law is a molding of precedents should make it more attractive to
the Supreme Court.
I hardly write on a clean slate in proposing that the Supreme Court drop
InternationalShoe. The Court itself has not left the test alone and has modified
it many times over the years.2" 4 Lower courts have created their own more
25
concrete considerations in attempts to clarify and apply the test.
Commentators have proposed many other tests.2" 6 All of these calls for action

Court's most recent decision on the subject, AsahiMetallndustryCo. v. SuperiorCourt,
480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987). See supra note 179. Sometimes the same concern is
expanded in prose to include the notion that a defendant "should reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there." Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474. This expansion adds
nothing to purposeful availment, as any defendant that purposefully avails itself of the
benefits and protections of a certain state will always be able to foresee being haled into
court there. See supra text accompanying notes 92-93. The requirement of purposeful
availment is reflected in the defendant's intentional entry into the state.
202. E.g., Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476-77.
203. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 148, § 3.11, at 140.
204. See supra Part IV.
205. See supra Part V.
206. Some of the proposals are for convenience or fairness based tests, and are
really InternationalShoe with a different coat of polish. See Cameron & Johnson, supra
note 8, at 841 (proposing thatjurisdiction rules should mirror venue rules); Heiser, supra
note 6, at 937, 955 (proposing use of "significant contacts/interested forum" test from
conflict of laws); McDermott, supra note 143, at 53 (proposing that a court should assess
fairness of trial at end); McMunigal, supra note 40, at 231 (proposing a three-step test
based on federalism, utility, and fairness); Stravitz, supra note 116, at 811 (proposing a
tripartite balancing test); David C. Tunick, International Shoe Should Get the Boot: An
Essay on Suggested Changes to the Law ofPersonalJurisdiction,70 U. DET.MERCY L.
REv. 241, 267, 276 (1993) (proposing two groups of factors plus a "catch-all" factor);
Woods, supra note 101, at 881-82 (proposing a "three-step analytical model"). These
tests based on a balancing of fairness solve none of the problems of the International
Shoe test.
Other commentators advise the Court to get out of the policing of state jurisdiction
entirely. See Borchers, supra note 12, at 589-90 (constitutional test cannot "do the
trick"); Borchers, supra note 40, at 103-04 (Court should leave jurisdiction entirely to
states or Congress.); Jay Conison, What Does Due Process Have To Do with Personal
Jurisdiction,46 RUTGERS L. REv. 1073, 1208-09 (1994). After a century-and-a-half of
Supreme Court policing of state court jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause, that
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will remain cries in the wilderness so long as the ipse dixit test of International
Shoe endures. The new test proposed in this Article will provide the stable and
predictable law so greatly needed in personal jurisdiction cases.
IX. APPLICATIONS OF THE LAW OF INTENTIONAL
TRANSACTIONAL ENTRY

While a proposed law may make sense in the midnight quiet of the library,
it must be tested in the daylight hurly-burly of litigated cases. This Part first
describes how the new law will achieve the policy goals of deciding personal
jurisdiction challenges with certainty, predictability, and efficiency. Following
that, this Article turns to practical, concrete applications of the law to the facts
of actual cases. It demonstrates how InternationalShoe and its progeny would
be decided. It then demonstrates how the new law will apply in two areas of
current controversy, stream of commerce cases and internet cases.
A. Benefits
The primary benefit of the new law of personal jurisdiction will not appear
in opinions deciding personal jurisdiction challenges under the new law; it will
be apparent in the disappearance of those opinions. The new law will make the
result of personal jurisdiction challenges much more predictable, and as a result
will greatly reduce the incentive to litigate this threshold issue.2" 7 All concerned,
from courts to counsel to clients, will benefit. A second benefit is that the new
law will greatly reduce the opportunities for forum-shopping by both parties.
The InternationalShoe test currently allows--even invites-both plaintiffs and
defendants to forum-shop through personal jurisdiction."'

seems quite unlikely to happen.
Some proposals are more specific and even unusual. See Cappalli, supra note 46
(advocating jurisdiction based on John Locke's social compact theory); Juenger, supra
note 54, at 20-23 (an international compact based on the Brussels Convention should be
negotiated); Moore, supra note 112, at 599-600 (analogizes to criminal defendant);
Weinberg, supra note 116, at 103-04 (advocating "pragmatic, minimalist approach" to
identify few cases of unfairness).
Professor Russell Weintraub first advocated jurisdiction based on fairness, and
filled more than one-half page listing all the factors the court should consider in reaching
its fairness decision. Weintraub, supra note 165, at 527-28. A decade later, he changed
his mind to propose that jurisdiction should exist whenever a state has a "rational basis
for wishing to decide the case," such as "defendant acted or caused consequences there,
or both," with unfairness handled easilyby transfer of venue. Weintraub, supranote 113,
at 545. That proposal is somewhat similar to the one made in this Article.
207. See supra notes 181-82.
208. See supra note 195; cf. Solimine, supra note 113, at 18-20.
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Third, when a rare challenge to personal jurisdiction is made, the new law
should produce a far more concise resolution of the challenge. In the typical
case, the court will be able to produce a brief opinion. 20 9 Even in factually
complicated cases, the opinions will be much shorter.210 The chronicling of
activities the defendant performed--or did not perform-in the state, as has
become almost boilerplate in minimum contacts decisions, will disappear.
Courts will no longer have to work down a checklist of contacts such as office,
agents, advertising, banking, sales, contracting, and delivery in the state.
InternationalShoe explicitly discarded the "presence" test for jurisdiction over

209. A few examples illustrate. The first is LaMarca v. Pak-Mor Manufacturing
Co., 735 N.E.2d 883 (N.Y. 2000). A Texas manufacturer sold a rear-loading garbage
truck device to its New York distributor, which resold it to the town of Niagara, New
York. Id. at 885. The plaintiff fell off the truck there due to an alleged defect. Id. The
Texas defendant sold the device into New York: that without question constituted
intentional transactional entry into the state. Id. at 886. The New York Court of Appeals
wrote five pages to reach the same result. The second is Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644
(5th Cir. 1994). The plaintiff from Pennsylvania gave a speech in Texas. Id. at 646. A
Texas reporter telephoned defendants in Indiana and Iowa for reactions to the speech.
Id. The plaintiff sued the defendants in Texas for defamation. Id. The defendants,
responding to a telephone call directed to them, did not intentionally enter Texas. Id. at
649. The Fifth Circuit wrote six pages to reach the same result. The third is IMO
Industries,Inc. v. KiekertAG, 155 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 1998). The plaintiff alleged that the
defendant, a German corporation, tortiously interfered with its attempt to sell an Italian
subsidiary by sending letters to the subsidiary in Italy and a bank in New York. Id. at
256. The plaintiff sued in New Jersey. Id. The defendant clearly made no intentional
transactional entry into New Jersey. Id. The Third Circuit wrote thirteen pages to reach
the same result.
210. Two examples illustrate. In Vons Cos. v. Seabest Foods,Inc., 926 P.2d 1085
(Cal. 1996), customers suffered food poisoning at many Jack-in-the-Box fast food
restaurants in California. Id. at 1088. Franchise restaurant owners whose customers had
not been injured sued both the corporate franchisor and meat suppliers in their home state
of California for damages due to the adverse publicity. Id. at 1089. The defendant meat
suppliers then filed a cross-complaint under California state practice (a third-party
complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14) against other franchisees located in
Washington state for damage to its own reputation and for indemnification against any
claims that might be brought by customers there. Id. The claim in the cross-complaint
arose from shipments of meat to the Washington defendants; they undoubtedly not only
paid for the meat but also communicated extensively with the California meat suppliers
over their multiple purchases. Id. That is intentional transactional entry. The California
Supreme Court wrote twenty-seven pages to reach the same result. In Griffis v. Luban,
646 N.W.2d 527 (Minn. 2002), an individual defendant living in Minnesota posted
messages on a website challenging the professional credentials of an individual plaintiff
living in Alabama. Id. at 530. That is not intentional transactional entry into Alabama.
See infra Part IX.D. The Minnesota Supreme Court wrote nine pages to reach the same
result.
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a foreign corporation, but did not discard these remnants of that test."' The new
law will finish that job.
Finally, when ajurisdictional challenge is raised, the court will decide based
on a law that all can understand. The InternationalShoe test, based on fairness,
necessarily results in what judges think is fair in the individual case. That result
may appear to be arbitrary to the losing party. Consequently, the current test
creates the appearance of injustice to the losing litigant even as it seeks to
squeeze the last drop of "justice" from each case. The proposed new test-an
understandable, bright-line law-will remove any appearance of impropriety or
injustice.
The new law of intentional transactional entry will not eliminate all
challenges to personal jurisdiction. Even though a bright-line test, it has some
play in the joints. Defendants may argue they did not enter the forum state, their
entry was not intentional, or their intentional entry was not part of the same
transaction giving rise to the plaintiffs claim. A court should seldom have
difficulty deciding whether a defendant entered a state, or whether the entry was
intentional. The element of the intentional transactional entry test that may
occasionally cause difficulty is the decision as to whether an intentional entry
was part of the transaction at issue. Even though it is not precise, the term
"transaction" is far more concrete than "fair play and substantial justice." Many
cases from related areas of the law already define the scope and meaning of
transaction.2" 2 Accordingly, even this analytical step should present little
difficulty in the vast majority of cases.
B. Application to Supreme Court Cases
Including InternationalShoe itself, the Supreme Court has granted plenary
review and decided twenty personal jurisdiction cases since 1945.2"3 Of those,

211. After working its way down the checklist of these evidences of "presence" of
a defendant in a state, Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 313-14 (1945), the
Court later rejected the "presence" test. Id. at 316-17.
212. The term "transaction" is essentially equivalent to "transaction or occurrence,"
which in its turn is essentially equivalent to "claim," which has been identified as a
"common nucleus of operative fact" in UnitedMine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,715
(1966), or "the same case or controversy under Article III" in 28 U.S.C. Section 1367.
All of these concepts are largely synonymous and derive from the concept of a single set
of facts that a lay person would expect to see tried together. That is the concept on which
Professor Charles E. Clark, reporter of the advisory committee, required "a short and
plain statement of the claim" in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). See generally
Douglas D. McFarland, The UnconstitutionalStub of Section 1441(c), 54 OHIO ST. L.J.

1059, 1061-68, 1076-77 (1993).
213. The cases following International Shoe are collected and analyzed in
Borchers, supra note 40, at 56-87; Cameron & Johnson, supra note 8, appendix I;

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol68/iss4/1

52

McFarland: McFarland: Drop the Shoe:

2003]

A LAW OFPERSONAL JURISDICTION

six involved an aspect of personal jurisdiction not of concern in this Article, 14
leaving fourteen cases to illustrate the application of the intentional transactional
entry test.
The decisions in thirteen of the fourteen cases would have been quite
straightforward under the proposed intentional transactional entry test.215 The
defendants in those cases would likely not even have raised a personal
jurisdiction challenge in most of the cases upholding personal jurisdiction; the
plaintiffs likely would not have even attempted to obtain jurisdiction over the

Kurland, supra note 57, at 586-623.
214. The six cases in chronological order are Mullane v. CentralHanoverBank &

Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (notice case also involving in personam or in rem
jurisdiction over beneficiaries of trusts); Insurance Corp. of Irelandv. Compagnie des
Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982) (waiver of jurisdictional objection); Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (jurisdiction over plaintiff class members
in class action suit); Burnham v. SuperiorCourt,495 U.S. 604 (1990) (jurisdiction based
on service within the state); Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 503 U.S. 917 (1992) (brief
jurisdictional issue in sovereign immunity case); and Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504
U.S. 298 (1992) (briefjurisdictional issue in tax case).
215. The one case of the fourteen that presents a difficult analysis is Kulko v.
Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978). The facts of the case were most unusual. The

plaintiff and the defendant were married in California when the defendant was there on
a military stopover en route overseas, but their entire married life was spent in New York.
Id. at 86-87. The wife left New York, obtained a Haitian divorce, and moved to
California. Id. at 87. The husband retained custody of the couple's two children in New
York, although they were to visit their mother in California during school and summer
vacations. Id. The father agreed to pay child support for those periods, and we must
assume he sent some payments to California. A year later, he purchased an airplane

ticket so his daughter could move permanently to California to live with her mother. Id.
at 87-88. Another three years later, unbeknownst to the father, the son also moved to
California. Id. at 88. The plaintiff mother then sued the defendant father in California
for increased child support. Id.
Did the defendant make an intentional transactional entry into California? All three

parts of the test present difficulties. First, neither the defendant's military stopover nor
the defendant's sending his daughter to California seems to be intentional, as that term
implies voluntary and uncoerced. As the Court stated the matter, "A father who agrees,
in the interests of family harmony and his children's preferences, to allow them to spend
more time in California than was required under a separation agreement can hardly be
said to have 'purposefully availed himself .... ." Id. at 94. Second, the defendant's
single entry into the state at the time of the marriage would not likely be considered part
of the same transaction as an obligation to pay child support two decades later.
Defendant's transmittal of child support payments into California might be considered

part of the same transaction in question, but that would return the analysis to the question
of whether his actions were intentional (voluntary). Finally, the defendant did enter the

state at the time of his marriage, but acquiescing in a daughter's wish to live with her
mother by buying her a ticket to the forum state would not likely constitute entry into the
state by the defendant.
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defendants in most or even all of the cases rejecting personal jurisdiction. If the
attempt were made by the plaintiff, the trial court decision on a challenge by the
defendant likely would have ended the jurisdictional dispute, and the challenge
would not reasonably have been taken to the appellate level.
Eleven of the fourteen cases are decided the same both by the Court and by
the intentional transactional entry test.
Six of those eleven same-result cases uphold personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. Those six cases are InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington,"' a state
suit to collect unemployment compensation contributions; Travelers Health
Ass 'n v. Virginia,"' a suit by the state commission to halt an unregistered
nonresident's insurance sales in the state; McGee v. InternationalLifeInsurance
Co.,"'8 a beneficiary's suit to collect the proceeds of a life insurance policy;
Keeton v. HustlerMagazine,Inc.,219 a suit for defamation in a magazine; Calder
v. Jones,22 a suit for defamation in a tabloid newspaper; and BurgerKing Corp.
v. Rudzewicz, 2 ' a franchisor's suit to collect payments due on a contract with a
franchisee.
Five of the eleven same-result cases reject personal jurisdiction over the
2 ' a shareholders' derivative
defendants. Those five cases are Shaffer v. Heitner,"

216. 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (the defendant made numerous intentional transactional
entries by hiring the sales personnel, soliciting sales, and shipping the product into the
state).
217. 339 U.S. 643 (1950) (the defendant made numerous intentional transactional
entries by soliciting insurance sales, investigating claims, and insuring 800 persons in the
state).
218. 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (the defendant made a single intentional transactional
entry by servicing a life insurance policy in the state).
219. 465 U.S. 770 (1984) (the defendant made an intentional transactional entry
by mailing the magazine containing the defamatory material into the state).
220. 465 U.S. 783 (1984) (Plaintiff, an actress living in California, sued four
defendants-the corporation, the local distributor, the reporter, and the editor-in
California state court for defamation in an article that appeared in the National Enquirer.
The corporation and the local distributor did not challenge jurisdiction. The reporter and
the editor, who both lived and worked on the article in Florida, did challenge jurisdiction.
Defendant reporter made numerous intentional transactional entries into California by
making telephone calls concerning the article into the state. The defendant editor would
have been dismissed. Even though he edited the article in question, and knew the subject
of the article lived in California, no facts in the record indicate he personally made an
intentional transactional entry into the state.).
221. 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (the defendant made numerous intentional transactional
entries by communications and sending payments into the state).
222. 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (the defendants made no intentional transactional
entry-even though they were officers and directors of a corporation domiciled in the
forum state-as all of their official actions giving rise to the claim took place in another
state).
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suit against the officers and directors of a corporation for causing the corporation
to engage in actions that resulted In an award of antitrust damages and a fine for
criminal contempt against it; Kulko v. Superior Court,22 3 a divorced wife's suit
against the husband for increased child support payments; Rush v. Savchuk,224
a quasi in rem suit against a driver for an auto accident in another state based on
ownership of an auto insurance policy issued by a company also having offices
in the forum state; World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 225 a products
liability suit for injury from a car fire during an accident in a state other than
where the car was purchased; and HelicopterosNacionales de Colombia, S.A.
v. Hall,226 a tort suit for a helicopter crash in Peru.
The results in only three of the fourteen cases would be different. In one
case, Perkins v. Benguet ConsolidatedMining Co.,227 the Court upheld personal
jurisdiction, but the new law would reject it. In two cases, the Court rejected
personal jurisdiction, but the new law would uphold it. The first is Hanson v.
Denckla,22 s a suit by residuary beneficiaries under a trust against persons taking
by power of appointment under the trust (and the bank trustee) over distribution
of the trust assets. The second is Asahi MetalIndustry Co. v. Superior Court,229
a third-party claim by a Japanese tire manufacturer against a Taiwanese tire valve
supplier arising out of a motorcycle accident in California. Both of these cases
are easy applications of the intentional transactional entry rule.23
This

223. 436 U.S. 84 (1978) (the defendant made no intentional transactional entryinto
the state); see supra note 215.
224. 444 U.S. 320 (1980) (the defendant auto driver made no intentional
transactional entry into the state as the auto accident occurred in another state).
225. 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (the defendants, a local retail auto dealer and regional
distributor, made no intentional transactional entry into the distant state where the
accident occurred).
226. 466 U.S. 408 (1984) (the defendant made no intentional transactional entry
into the forum state, even though it had negotiated a contract, purchased equipment, and
received personnel training there, as these entries were not transactionally related to a
helicopter crash in a foreign country).
227. 342 U.S. 437 (1962) (The Court found jurisdiction over a foreign corporation
based on its continuous and systematic activities in a state. The intentional transactional
entry test would refuse jurisdiction as the defendant's intentional entry into the state was
transactionally unrelated to the claim. The intentional transactional entry test does not
recognize general jurisdiction.); see supra text accompanying notes 186-88.
228. 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (the defendant bank trustee made numerous intentional
transactional entries through active management of trust business in cooperation with
settlor of trust located in forum state).
229. 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (the defendant made an intentional transactional entry
by placing its product into the stream of commerce with knowledge that a substantial
percentage of units would enter the forum state); see infra text accompanying note 231.
230. Both Hanson andAsahi, in which the Supreme Court refusedjurisdiction, cry
out for application of the trite admonition, "hard cases make bad law." The defendant
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adjustment of a few outcomes is a reasonable price to pay for the many benefits
that will accrue from the new law.
This Article has demonstrated how the law of intentional transactional entry
would decide the same cases presented to the Supreme Court during the regime
of InternationalShoe. Now the law will be applied to two areas of current
controversy.
C. Stream of Commerce Cases
Placing a product into the stream of commerce is not an intentional entry
into any state except the one that is the headwaters of the stream. The defendant
does not know where the stream might flow. As soon as one adds facts,
however, an intentional transactional entry can be found. When the defendant
is aware of the route a particular product will follow, and that product gives rise
to a suit, the defendant rather obviously intentionally enters every state on the
shipping route. Of course, that level of knowledge is highly unlikely.
More likely, the defendant will not be aware of the destination of any one
unit; the defendant will be aware only that a certain percentage of its product will
be shipped into the forum state. Here also the defendant makes a transactional
entry into the state. The only question is whether the entry is intentional. A
defendant must aim to hit a state for the state's courts to be able to hit back. A
defendant who places multiple units of a product into the stream of commerce
with knowledge that some of those units will enter the forum state aims at that

Delaware bank in Hanson engaged in continuous and systematic communications to and
from the forum state (Florida) in managing the trusts, yet upholding jurisdiction would
have resulted in two contestants for the assets winning big and two contestants losing big.
Hanson, 357 U.S. at 252-53. When the Court rejected jurisdiction, the resulting
distribution of assets allowed all parties to share. The primary action in Asahi was a
products liability suit arising from a motorcycle accident in California. Asahi, 480 U.S.
at 105-06. The action settled, leaving only a cross-complaint (third-party action) between
a Taiwanese tire manufacturer and a Japanese tire valve supplier. The Court rejected
jurisdiction over this derivative dispute even though the record showed that the Japanese
tire valve supplier knew approximately 100,000 of its valves annually reached California
in the stream of commerce. Adjudication in California of a dispute between two parties
located across the Pacific Ocean did not strike the Justices as "fair." Id. at 116.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol68/iss4/1

56

McFarland: McFarland: Drop the Shoe:
2003]

A LA W OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION

state.23' The defendant's product is "substantially certain" to enter the state;
substantial certainty is intent.232 The state can hit back with a suit arising from
a unit of the product that actually did enter the state. That is intentional
transactional entry.

D. Internet Cases
The current law of personal jurisdiction in cases arising through
transmissions over the internet is a hodgepodge.233 Albeit other articles have
attempted to suggest paths through that hodgepodge, 3 this Article enters the
area briefly to demonstrate the path that the intentional transactional entry test
would blaze.
A person who does no more than post information on a web site on the
internet intentionally transactionally enters no state. The alternative is that a
person who creates a web site or responds to a web site enters every state and
indeed every nation in the world. After all, the name is the World Wide Web.

231. The Court in Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112, reasoned, "[M]inimum contacts must
come about by an actionofthe defendantpurposefully directedtoward theforum State."
That concept governing stream of commerce cases is consistent with the argument made
here. The error in Asahi is the Court's next assertion that the "defendant's awareness that
the stream of commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum State does not
convert the mere act of placing the product into the stream into an act purposefully
directed toward the forum State." Id. Awareness that some-certainly awareness that
a substantial percentage-of the units of the product will flow into the forum state should
qualify as "purposefully directed," Even the case that represents the zenith of Court
concern for state sovereignty, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
297-98 (1980), opined in dictum that a state could assert "personal jurisdiction over a
corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation
that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State."
232. See supra note 183.
233. The "current hodgepodge of case law is inconsistent, irrational, and
irreconcilable." Howard B. Stravitz, PersonalJurisdictionin Cyberspace: Something
More Is Required on the Electronic Stream of Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REv. 925, 939
(1998); see, e.g., Joseph S. Bums & Richard A. Boles, PersonalJurisdiction and the
Web, 53 MAINE L. REV. 29, 31 n.3 (2001) (collecting articles on "the inconsistencies that
have resulted from the inherent difficulty in conceptualizing the Web"); Sarah K.
Jezairian, Lost in the Virtual Mail: Is Traditional Personal Jurisdiction Analysis
Applicable to E-Commerce Cases?,42 ARiz. L. REv. 965 (2000); Erica D. O'Loughlin,
Note, The Times They Are A-Changin': PersonalJurisdictionin Cyberspace, 66 Mo. L.
REV. 623, 636-39 (2001) (showing split of courts).
234. E.g., Susan Nauss Exon, A New Shoe Is Needed to Walk Through Cyberspace
Jurisdiction, 1I ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 1 (2000); Todd D. Leitstein, Comment, A
Solutionfor PersonalJurisdictionon the Internet, 59 LA. L. REv. 565 (1999); Recent
Cases, CTE New Media Services Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F3d 1343 (D.C. Cir.
2000), 113 HARV. L. REV. 2128 (2000).
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The act of posting information on a web site is analogous to placing a product
into the stream of commerce with no knowledge of the direction of the stream.
When a person undertakes additional acts beyond the bare posting of
information on a web site, an intentional transactional entry into a state may
occur. One example is a defendant who sells over the internet. An internet seller
who accepts an order for a product with knowledge that the customer is making
the order from a particular state does not enter the state on that fact alone;
however, sending confirmation of the order to the customer in the forum state is
an intentional transactional entry. Also, shipping the product to the customer in
the forum state is without question an intentional transactional entry.235 A
second example is a person who sets up an interactive web site that automatically
responds to an internet user. That fact alone is not an intentional entry into any
state, but an individualized response with knowledge of the state where the
person is located clearly is an intentional transactional entry. Sending an e-mail
to a person known to be in state A is an intentional transactional entry into state
A as much as is addressing and mailing a letter via the U.S. mail into state A.
X. CONCLUSION
This Article analyzes why the minimum contacts/fair play test for personal
jurisdiction created in InternationalShoe, and expanded in later decisions of
both the Supreme Court and other courts, is not working. The Article then
proposes a new law of personal jurisdiction: the intentional transactional entry
test. Some will label this new bright-line law abecedarian. That is its major
benefit. The new law decides the threshold issue of personal jurisdiction with
efficiency, certainty, predictability, stability, and uniformity, instead of
demanding a case-by-case quixotic quest for pure fairness and justice.
I am not naive enough to suggest that this new law will eliminate close
cases, but it will answer ajurisdictional challenge quickly and clearly in the vast
bulk of cases. That will be a great improvement over current law, in which
nearly every case is a close case requiring extended analysis, often at the
appellate level. True, the new law may reach some defendants in situations
where the jurisdictional reach does not seem "fair," and may waive aside some
defendants in situations where a convenience-based jurisdictional reach would

235. In this manner the intentional transactional entry test operates in a similar
fashion as the rule that the cases appear to be developing: a passive web site does not
give rise to jurisdiction, but an active web site does. This has come to be called a sliding
scale approach from its creation in Zippo ManufacturingCo. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952
F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). See Recent Cases, supra note 234, at 2129-30. This
developing law of the internet brings to mind also the active/passive, buyer/seller gloss
some states place on the minimum contacts test. See supra text accompanying note 144.
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seem "fair," 2 3' 6 but the tail of those few cases should not wag the personal

jurisdiction dog. The law is far better served by recognizable and applicable
legal principles that decide the overwhelming majority of cases surely and
swiftly than by an amorphous search for "fair play" in each and every individual
case.

236. See supra text accompanying notes 227-30.
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